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This study examines the political orientations o f Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük 
ve Dayanışma Partisi) in terms o f its organizational and political aspects. The main 
question it addresses is the extent to which the party represents the new approach to 
politics in Turkey. To explain the conception o f the ‘new’, it analyzes the transformation 
o f the left both in Europe and Turkey since the 1960s.
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The most popular word for the 1990s is “change”, as everybody, both on the left 
and on the right o f the political spectrum, is talking about the fact that the world is not 
what it used to be. At least for two centuries, ideologies have been dominated by the 
dualist structure o f modernity which corresponded to two sets o f opposition. ‘Progress’ 
has been juxtaposed with its opposite, ‘reaction’, while ‘revolution’ was justified by 
‘counter-revolution’. Today the conception o f the world now forces us to understand the 
change in terms o f Fukuyama’s argument about the “end o f history”. The reason for this 
was the collapse o f the Leninist model in Eastern Europe, which represented the opposite 
o f the liberal, capitalist tradition in the West and the inadequacy of the social democratic 
tradition in the West to bring new alternatives to the re-organization o f capitalism in global 
level. In this respect, the differences between the left and the right are eroding in the 
1990s, as both the social democrat and the communist parties come up with solutions, 
which only slow up the process o f the re-structuring o f capitalism.
Although in general, the terms left and right eroded, the dynamics in Turkey were 
different than the European experience. The military junta in 1980 pacified the socialist 
movement both in its political and social terms. Not only the left in its general sense, but 
also the right was affected from this trend as all the political parties o f the pre-1980 period 
were closed. The labor unions, chambers o f business and the civil societal organizations
were banned from participating in political activities. The outcome was the political 
environment in which only some segments o f the society had access to the political. The 
only civil alternative in the post-1983 period was the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi), 
that hold on to governmental posts till 1991.
With the introduction o f neo-liberal policies, the economy was transformed into an 
export-oriented system, in which the state expenditures were minimized, and the wages 
were fixed. No serious counter-alternative could be developed, as the right to organize 
was strictly controlled. The only alternative for the remaining left circles was to join the 
“permitted” social democrat party, that is Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP).
SHP was the coalition partner with the conservative oriented True Path Party 
(Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) from 1991 to 1995. During the coalition government o f DYP 
and SHP, the war in the southeastern region continued, costing human lives and budget 
deficits, the privatization wave continued to be on the agenda, and the gap between the 
rich and the poor has increased. The left in Turkey, which was identified with the social 
democrats, faced the inadequacy to bring new alternatives.
Under these circumstances, the socialist left, that faced a big defeat with the 1980 
military intervention, started a debate within itself, in order to realize a program, which is 
believed to be based on anti-capitalism, with taking into considerations o f the post-1968 
developments. Although the debates started on the basis o f individual organizations, the 
debates evolved into forming legal political parties on the basis o f the mutual existence o f 
different groups. There were three main dynamics behind the idea o f the debates. Firstly, 
the re-formulation of Marxism in global level effected nearly all organizations that forced
them to re-evaluate the theoretical orientations o f the movements. Secondly, the 
inadequacy o f the social democratic tradition to bring alternatives to the problems of 
Turkey raised the expectations to form a new kind of leftism. Thirdly, the socialist left of 
Turkey that faced the greatest defeat in its history in 1980 re-organized itself so that it can 
be on the political agenda o f the country. The formulation was vitalized, as the Freedom 
and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi, ÖDP) came into existence, that can 
be labeled as the representative o f the new left in Turkey.
Throughout this study, I tried examine the third road within the left, which 
distances itself both from the social democratic and pre-1980 socialist alternatives in 
Turkey. As the boundaries between the terms left and right are eroding both at national 
and international levels, ÖDP is trying to formulate a new conception o f the term left, 
from the perspective o f socialists.
The first chapter focuses on the communist experience that formalized itself in the 
real existing socialisms and the social democrat experience in Western capitalist countries. 
While elaborating on the Western tradition, the Eurocommunist alternative, the new left 
experience and the institutionalisation o f the new social movements o f the 1960s will be 
examined. In conceptualizing the term new left, I rely on Gramsci’s conception of civil 
society, and Hayek’s understanding o f the impossibility o f the centralization o f knowledge 
will be elaborated in order to understand the conceptualization o f the term new left.
The second chapter focuses on the transformation o f the socialist left in Turkey, 
starting from the 1960s until the establishment o f ÖDP in the 1996. In this respect, only 
the socialist organizations that are related to and represented in the party were taken into 
consideration. When elaborating on the ideological and organizational structures in
relation to their political practices both in the pre and post 1980 military intervention, I 
examine the debates within the socialist left in conjunction with the conception o f the term 
new left.
In the third chapter, the significance o f ODP, both in terms o f approaching politics, 
as well as its uniqueness in the organizational structure are taken into account, as these 
two issues represent the new approach to what constitutes ‘the political’. By giving 
extensive examples from the magazines, meetings, declarations, and the party program, I 
analyze the distinguishing aspects o f ODP from the old socialist tradition in Turkey.
In conclusion, I discuss ODP’s place within the Marxist tradition both in Turkey 
and Europe. The similarities, as well as the differences will be taken into account, that 
would help the reader to understand ODP as a unique project that contains both the old 
and the new trends.
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CHAPTER II
From the Old to the New: The Transformation of the Left in Europe
It has been argued that the left is in a legitimacy crisis in the 1990s for it can not 
bring alternatives to the existing social order in the global sense.’ Kellner argued that, 
Marxism has been in crisis throughout the twentieth century.^ Just as the failed revolution 
o f the German Spartacists, suppression o f the communist movements in the time o f fascist 
regimes, the relative success o f the social democratic “third way” and the anti­
authoritarian 1968 movements have shown, it was Marxism that always came into the 
picture in order to be criticized, but it was again Marxism, in one way or another, that 
succeeded surviving throughout the 20th century.
It can be argued in the 1990s that Marxism is in crisis, but it must be remembered 
that this is something that was always experienced by the Marxist tradition. The most 
important difference o f the present crisis, from the past experiences, is the collapse o f the 
existing real socialisms and the inadequacy o f both the social democratic and the 
communists traditions within the Western democracies to bring new alternatives to the 
changes that are taking place. In one way or another in the past, both the reformist or the 
revolutionary wings o f Marxism channeled the discontent o f the other into a gain for itself, 
which enabled them to continue their being. But in the 1980s, the trend was reversed, and
’Here, the term “left” contains both the reformist/social democrat, and the revolutionary/communist 
models.
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there appeared a negative attitude to both o f these movements that created the existing 
crisis.
In this chapter, I will focus on the post-war period o f three Marxist trends. The 
first one will be based on the Sovietic model of socialism, which is affiliated with the 
Eastern Bloc countries including the Soviet Russia. The other is the Western experience o f 
social democracy which was derived from Marxism, but changed its ideological 
orientations in the preceding years. Within Western Marxism, when analyzing social 
democracy, the Eurocommunists will also be taken into account, as they can be considered 
within the social democratic experience. Lastly, I will delineate the new left experience, 
that is rooted in both Western Marxism and the anti-authoritarian movements in the 
former Soviet Bloc countries. In this respect, the challenge o f 1968 movements and the 
organizations that they created will be elaborated which can be labeled as a search for a 
third road within the left, between the revolutionary communist and reformist social 
democrat experiences.
It was after the First World War that a split occurred within the social democrat 
parties in Europe. In very general terms, the ones who identified themselves with the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 are referred to be as communists, whereas the others, that 
were strictly tied to the democratic understanding o f liberal democratic tradition called 
themselves social democrats. The communists, who are in favor o f a revolution against the 
bourgeois state argued that it was only possible by a violent uprising that a worker’s state 
and government can be formed. In this respect, all the bourgeois ideals, and forms would
^Dougles Kellner, “The End of Orthodox Marxism”, Marxism in the Postmodern Age (New York: The 
Guilford Press, 1993), p. 34.
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be suppressed by the newly formed state that would transform the existing capitalist 
society to an egalitarian and free society, that is socialism and communism respectively.
To some extent, the dream o f “bread, work and peace”  ^ was vitalized by the -so 
called- socialist/communist governments, but the lack o f a free political spectrum could 
not be met within these “real existing socialisms”, which is one o f the reasons that there 
always arises the question of how to label these regimes. This question was raised 
specifically within the critical Marxist tradition in the Western developed countries.
As noted the exploitation in the bureaucratic regimes was capitalist in its nature, 
because the Council o f Industrial Ministers replaced the private capitalist cooperation’s' 
board o f directors and the there did not exist a change in the mode o f production.'* In this 
respect, although the ownership of the means o f production has changed, the nature of 
production stayed the same. The surplus value was distributed among the police, the 
military, and the party members, in order to secure the established social order, expand the 
means o f production and labor power. In the post-1960 period, there appeared a crisis 
because the surplus could not be distributed -due to the backward technology- for the 
system to survive. In this case the surplus was too small for being a great power in the 
Cold War era, increasing the social services that were provided, catching up with the new 
technology, the ideological, political and economic bureaucracy for legitimizing itself on 
material basis and the popular hunger for individual consumption due to the developments 
in the information systems. The intentions o f the system has changed from state oriented
^The slogan o f the Bolsheviks before the revolution. Food to the people, job to everybocfy and withdrawal 
from the First World War.
''Stephen Resnick and Richard D. Wolf, “The End of the USSR: A Marxian Class Analysis”, Marxism in 
Postmodern Age, p. 328.
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central planning for the collective good o f the people to the problem o f securing the 
existing structures.
The end was not an overnight incident but was the outcome o f the long process 
that started by the October Revolution o f the Bolsheviks in 1917/The Leninist model that 
forced a monolithic organization o f the social, economical and cultural life was under the 
supervision of the vanguards that blocked the way for any pluralist attempt to realize the 
basic socialist principles o f freedom and solidarity, on the basis of equality/Treedom o f the 
individuals was “sacrificed in the name o f egalitarianism, that turned the concept o f 
citizenship into an empty shell.”  ^The attempts to reform the existing socialism from within 
Marxism failed to achieve success because o f the “success” o f the existing, party 
structures. The invasion o f Hungary in 1956, the suppression o f the libertarian movements 
in Prague 1968 and the ‘Solidarity Movement’ in Poland should be perceived in this 
respect, as not anti-, but pro-socialist movements that tried to bring socialist pluralism, in 
their own way, to the monolithic structure.
While the Soviet Bloc came to an end in 1989, it was thought that the only left 
alternative other than the communist tradition was the social democrats. On the other 
hand, one must remember that even the social democrat ideology was also unable to bring 
a new alternative, exceeding the limits o f liberal democratic tradition. The history o f 
welfare state, that was affiliated with the social democratic governments, was the outcome 
o f the postwar economic boom.
After the Second World War, it was expected by the social democrats that both the 
conservative and the liberal wings o f the political spectrum would not be as strong as they
^Ralph Miliband, “Reclaiming the Alternative”, Marxism in Postmodern Age, p. 221.
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were in the pre-fascist periods. In this respect, only the communists were taken as a 
serious threat. In the northern parts o f Europe, the social democrats did not face what they 
expected, and achieved the majority of the left votes in the elections. On the other hand, in 
the Southern Parts of Western Europe, the communist parties did better than their social 
democrat counterparts. This was due to their highly respected anti-fascist struggle, and the 
well organized party relations.
The post-war boom in the world economy, which was the largest boom in the 
history o f capitalism,^ helped to increase the Keynesian economics to be realized in its full 
sense as the state regulated the market and intervened whenever it was necessary. With the 
introduction o f a planned market economy, it was thought that full employment could be 
reached. Up to the end o f the 1950s, nearly all the social democrat parties tried to hold on 
to their ‘party o f the working class’ ideology, although their practical orientation differed, 
as now they transformed themselves into ‘people’s parties’.
The class structure has changed in Europe in the post-war period, with the 
growing number o f employees in the service sector. As Marx predicted, the blue-collar 
workers have never hold the majority in any capitalist country. The signifying aspect o f the 
1950s was the decrease in the number o f blue-collar workers and the increase in the white- 
collar professionals. In order to gain the votes o f the newly emerged professionals, the 
social democrat parties also tried to appeal to the middle classes, which effected their 
ideological orientations. The Bad Godesburg Conference o f German Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) in 1959 should be perceived in this respect as Godesburg Programme
®Mandel, Ernest. Kapitalist Gelişmenin Uzun Dalgalan (İstanbul; Yazın Yayıncılık, 1992).
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represented the "...acceptance o f the postwar order with an appeal for reform in a 
formula which was to typify European social democracy in the 1960s and 1970s".’
After the 1970s, an ideological crisis occurred due to a decrease in the votes that 
the social democrats received. It must be noted that the failure of the social democratic 
alternatives was due to their success rather than their failure. That is, they could not bring 
new perspectives exceeding the limits o f the establishment. This was not the only 
determinant for the explanation o f the crisis in the reformist tradition, as also the 
conjuncture forced the governments to give up the Keynesian managerial economics and 
rather apply monetarist policies that jeopardized the legitimacy and existence of the social 
welfare states. The two last radical alternatives within the social democratic tradition were 
the Meidner Plan in Sweden and the socialist government o f France in the 1980s. The 
former proposed that all the means o f production would be handed to the labor unions in a 
specific period o f time.* The plan was criticized even by the social democrat members and 
was rejected. On the other hand the socialists with the support o f the communist party 
started a nationalization project in France. The outcome was disastrous as unemployment 
and inflation raised. The antagonist character o f the party basis, which was composed of 
Catholics, blue and white collar workers eroded as the state resources could not be 
mobilized against the market forces.^ Especially with Toni Blair’s Labor Party in United 
Kingdom, this crisis intended to be overcome by moving to the right o f the political 
spectrum.
^Stephen Padgett & William E. Paterson. Social Democracy in Postwar Europe (London; Longman,
1991), p. 29.
**Jonas Pontusson, “Sweden: After the Golden Age.” Mapping the West European Left, ed. Perry Anderson 
and Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1994), p. 29.
Padgett. Social Democracy, p. 166.
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The most important change occurred in the economical outlook o f the Labor Party 
as the Article Four'” o f the party program was abolished. Except the government o f 1945, 
this article represented a continuous tradition in theory, and the practical application of 
this was never vitalized by any government. In this sense, it was only an article to 
represent the roots o f the party. On the other hand, the symbolic removal o f this meant 
that the Labor Party was trying to get rid o f its labor party outlook as being the 
representative o f the working class, and trying to have a new outlook which would in turn 
attract the votes o f the middle classes too. This trend was even further justified by the new 
tax policy o f the party as now the party demanded an increase o f the tax rate just for the 
upper class, but not for the middle class.
The differentiating lines between the social democrats and the conservative parties 
eroded in the 1990s, as the fiscal policies were replaced by monetarist measures. While 
these changes were taking place within the social democratic understanding o f Western 
left, the Communist parties o f the liberal democracies were eroding both in terms o f 
quality and quantity.
In 1953, Togliatti, the leader o f the Italian Communist party, declared the approval 
o f different national paths to socialism. This was a historical turning point in the 
communist tradition as for the first time, polycentrism was adopted. The roots o f this trend 
can be dated back to the writings o f Gramsci, Luxembourg, Lukács, and even the Austro-
'^ T^his article was put on the program in 1918, in which it was stated that means o f production and 
distribution should be publicly owned by the state.
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Marxist tradition* ‘ which tried to formulate a different interpretation o f Marxism other 
than the Bolshevik understanding o f Marxism as a science.
As Boggs argued four long-term factors contributed to the rise of 
Eurocommunism in Spain, France and Italy: The erosion of Catholicism, détente, the 
Sino-Soviet split and the onset o f pluralism within world communism and the long term 
involvement o f the Communist Parties in liberal democratic institutions.*^ Taking 
parliament as an active and decisive actor in transition was a step further. As Gruppi 
argued “political system most appropriate to socialism”*^ was liberal representative 
democracy. Eurocommunists viewed the state as a place for class struggle, not as an 
institution o f class domination. In this respect, they tried to become dominant in the state 
apparatus in order to make structural reforms, which would be an ongoing process o f 
democratization. They proposed the colonization of the bourgeois state, rather than 
mobilizing change from the grass roots level.
In the mean time, the lack o f a concrete definition of the term “structural 
reformism” made Eurocommunism only a reaction to the Soviet way o f achieving 
socialism. The electoral policies o f Eurocommunist parties turned out to be just for votes 
and not for immediate changes for general socialist ideals. For popular credibility, the 
acceptance o f the multi-nationals, mixed economies, the NATO and the EC paved the way 
for an erosion o f the anti-system outlook o f the parties that turned them into institutional
"The school of thought within the Austrian Social Democrat Party, that tried to find a middle way 
between the reformist Second International and the revolutionary Communist (Third) International. The 
important figures were Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Max Adler and Rudolf Hilferding.
’^Carl Boggs, The Socialist Tradition: From Crisis to Decline. (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 104.
13,ibid, p. 113.
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oppositions. The outcome o f this trend was consensus at elite level and alienated politics 
at the mass level, which did not create an alternative for the existing situation.
Although they incorporated the ideas of the New Social Movements, their 
traditional basis, composed of blue collar workers, and Catholics always stood as a barrier 
against forming organic ties with them as they had contradictory standings. On the other 
hand they failed to engage in the widespread local activism o f the post-1968 movements 
as they always had an anti-1968 outlook which they considered as being adventurous.
The most important commonality between the reformist Western tradition that 
both includes the social democrats and the communists and the revolutionary movements 
o f the Marxist tradition -regardless o f the different versions- was that they always tried to 
capture the power o f the state. Political revolution was formulated as transforming the 
state, whereas social revolution was seen as a subordinate o f the state and has not been 
given the importance that it deserved.
The hierarchical domination o f the public over the private sphere always brought 
the question of “management” o f the other in order to transfer the social and economical 
structure for the socialist goals. Another important factor, which is visible in these two 
versions o f Marxism, the evolutionaries and the revolutionaries in very concrete terms, 
was the centralization o f the knowledge in the public sphere in order to transform the 
existent structures. This knowledge was taken as the scientific knowledge that was shaped 
by the positivist understanding o f social laws which move in a linear path, to reach to the 
level o f progress. The outcome was the argument that the social laws o f progress has the 
potential to be discovered and re-shaped by the ones who can have access to this kind o f 
specific knowledge.
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In order to understand the significance o f the term new left, Gramsci’s civil society 
understanding and Hayek’s theory o f knowledge should be elaborated. Although Gramsci 
and Hayek seem to be resting on completely opposite grounds, a deeper analysis would 
show us that the term new left owed them a great deal of effort to constitute a new way o f 
approaching politics.
Any social group, according to Gramsci, must have a hegemonic world view in 
order to gain power. In this sense, the concept o f hegemony is organic, which is created by 
the conscious and reflective human agents. Moreover, hegemony is not metaphysical, as it 
is reproduced, modified, channeled, renewed and defended which also has a praxis side 
that describes a process o f conscious intellectual reflection.
Gramsci argued that a productive communication should be developed with the 
other social groups which are “fnendly” to the proletarian class, and assimilate them when 
necessary. Only with assimilation o f the others the concept o f hegemony can be extended. 
There is the dialectical strategy o f the dominant group in the society. Either it can use 
force by the penal system o f the army and police to overcome its opponents, or it 
persuades them to accept and assimilate the norms. The latter was more preferable as the 
concept of consent came into the picture. Although a non-hegemonic alliance can achieve 
power through a coup d’etat, it would be lacking the sufficient hegemonic legitimacy. In 
this respect, a historical block will be able to take power, only once it has developed a 
universal perspective which transcends the particular self interests o f its component parts. 
As the hegemony needs and requires leadership that is actively created, the alternative 
hegemony should also develop a political, economical and moral leadership. The concept
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of leadership is given a dominant role as the social group is required to exercise some kind 
o f a leadership before the critical moment o f social upheaval.
Gramsci places the civil society within the superstructure. Moreover he 
differentiates two levels o f the superstructure; at the political and the civil society levels. 
The political society is for coercion. It is for the purpose of assimilating popular masses to 
the type o f production and economics in a given period. On the contrary, in the civil 
society, hegemony o f a social group over the entire national society is exercised through 
so-called private organizations such as the church, the trade unions, and the schools.*^ The 
state can make use o f the private institutions o f the civil society that would become the 
tools o f coercive force (religion, political parties become the constituent components o f 
the state apparatus). All institutions have an ideological and practical effect upon the 
individuals.
By explaining the revolutionary tactics, Gramsci indicates the importance o f war o f 
maneuver on the one hand, and the war o f position on the other. The latter represents a 
progressive undermining o f the ‘trench systems’, and permanent fortifications whereas the 
other stands for the taking control of the society in one move by overthrowing the 
coercive agencies o f the state, and its military forces. He then further discusses that in a 
relatively democratic order, like the liberal democracies o f the western developed 
countries, the war o f position should be applied, at least in the first instance. The emerging 
group should wage a war o f position aimed at both freeing the minds o f the individuals 
from distortions o f bourgeois ideals through a process o f hegemonic critique and at the




same time freeing their bodies from the contradictory practices o f bourgeois society 
through the gradual subversion o f these practices.
The main argument that Hayek has put forward about the scientific knowledge is 
that because o f its natural character o f the economic knowledge, it can not be known by 
individual people or by collective founded organizations as his conception o f knowledge 
changes due to time and space.** On the other hand he argues that scientific knowledge 
does not constitute the totality o f the knowledge, but just a part of it. In this sense the 
knowledge can not be known wholly as it is a short lived phenomena. In this sense, the 
assumption that the economic knowledge, which is supposed to be pre-coded 
generalization, can not be centralized. O f course Hayek’s argument is the means to justify 
his free-market orientation, that became very popular under the Conservative governments 
o f United Kingdom and the Republican governments o f USA. But there appears to be an 
elective affinity between his understanding o f the impossibility of centralization o f the 
knowledge-in this sense economic knowledge-and the confrontation o f the new left with 
the old left, which gains legitimacy from the assumptions o f Hayek.
From the above statements o f Gramsci and Hayek, it is obvious that the political 
revolution which the old left has always put on the agenda became meaningless as the 
consent o f the individuals to the existing “non-hegemonic hegemony” was never achieved 
within the civil society. The transformation o f the society should be started from the civil 
society, which would inevitably became a political revolution, only if the hegemonic block 
can successfully achieve the social revolution first. In this respect, the new left, having 
been influenced by Gramsci’s writings proposed that demands of groups rather than the
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working class should be addressed within a political framework. Hayek’s argument about 
the impossibility o f the centralization o f knowledge is also important for understanding the 
new left, as the concept o f the truth was indirectly criticized by him. In this respect, there 
seems to appear the acceptation o f different truths, which changes in time.
The Western Marxist alternative, that was influenced by the writings o f Lukács, 
Gramsci, Frankfurt School, Fromm, Sartre, Gorz has always been critical o f the existing 
socialisms in the Eastern Block. Moreover it has also been critical o f the liberal capitalist 
tradition o f the Western developed countries which incorporated the social democratic 
tradition. Their interests were in a more wider spectrum, which included ideology, culture, 
psychology and everyday life o f the individual, which gave birth to a different 
understanding o f the concept o f “revolution”; that is a change within the existing civil 
society which included ideals such as democratic self management, local autonomy and 
cultural transformations. This critical approach was obliterated by Stalinism, fascism and 
Keynesian engineered welfare state throughout the 20th century. It was only with the 
movements o f 1968 that the new left emerged as a political actor in the social life which 
realized a comprehensive social upheaval against the old.
The new social movements which emerged in the late 1960s aimed to overcome 
the US hegemony in the post-war period and to vitalize the aims o f the October 
Revolution, which was never achieved. As Wallerstein argued, the old left was constituted 
by three main actors: The Communists of the Third International tradition, reformers and 
social democrats o f the Second International that were able to hold on governmental posts 
in the liberal democratic tradition o f the Western countries and the nationalist movements
'®Hillary Wainwright, Yeni Bir Sol Üzerine Tartışmalar: Serbest Piyasacı Sağa Cevaplar (İstanbul:
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that succeeded in gaining their political autonomies in the post-war period-especially in the 
so called third world countries.*^ The mistake o f the old left was to over-estimate the 
hegemonic institutionalization power of the US in the post-war period to stop the 
extension o f the old left take overs as it was the case in Korea, Greece and Chile. 
Moreover, the US deepened the conflicts that raised between the Second and Third 
Internationals which paved the way for a diversification o f the working class movements in 
global sense.
On the other hand, the US, while achieving success on the two cases, concentrated 
on the stabilization o f the radical nationalists movements in the Third World that became a 
success except for some minor examples, such as Vietnam.'* While the inadequacy of the 
old left became a fact to confront the ideological hegemony o f the US, the new left, first, 
tried to reform the existing old tradition from within, but as it failed to do so, it directly 
opposed everything that it represents that reached its peek point in the 1968 movements. 
The new left accused the old left for five sins:
Degeneration... for loosing the radicalism when some kind of success 
was achieved by their anti-systemic attitudes; neglect... for not 
realizing or consciously not imderstanding the interests o f the 
dispossed and the dis-advantageous groups (sub-proletarians, ethnic 
and racial minorities and the women); weakness... for the inadequacy 
to handle the problems of exploitation, militarism, imperialism and
Aynnti Yayınevi, 1995), p. 94.
’^Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, “1968: Büyük Prova”, Sistem Karşıtı 
Hareketler (Anti-Systemic Movements) (İstanbul: Metis Yayınlan, 1995), pp 96-113.
'**Minor in the sense of quantity not quality as the case of Vietnam became a huge ideological, military
defeat both in Vietnam and in USA.
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racism in the world system; together committing a crime... for gaining 
some advantage from exploitation o f the disadvantageous groups; and 
confidence... for underestimating the real interests o f the sub­
categories within the social structure and a full commitment to the 
ideologies o f themselves.'^
One o f the outcomes o f the assault o f the new left was that the power o f the north 
over the south was declining as the former began to have some problems to control the 
south. The proof o f this can be clearly seen in the Vietnamese, Iranian and Nicaraguan 
Revolutions. It is more likely that the dominant state systems, both at the national and 
international level have some problems in controlling the movements o f the age groups, 
gender and the ethnic groups. This trend is stronger in the north, that is the developed 
countries, and to a lesser extent influential in the less developed countries o f south. As 
long as the long-term consequences were concerned, the relationship between the capital 
and labor could not be achieved like in the case o f the pre-1968 period, that is based on 
full consensus.
On the other hand, the state is less likely to have the power o f controlling the civil 
society by the interests o f the power holders. The proof o f this can be the democratization 
wave in the post-1973 period in Argentina, Portugal, Spain and Greece. With all these 
developments came the crisis o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat in China, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland that speeded up the process o f 1989 in the Eastern Block. The 
attempt to confront with the Chinese ruling bureaucracy in Cultural Revolution was a 
failure, just because it was stabilized by Mao, not because it failed to do so. Moreover, the
19,ibid, pp. 100-101.
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incidents o f Prague 1968 was another sign that the dictatorship o f the proletariat, at least 
in its Soviet model, was threatened from within the existing party apparatus. These two 
developments, on the other hand, showed us that the old left was very eager to stabilize 
the existing situation by even using force against these movements.
In this context, 1968 in the global sense was both a product and a producer. It was 
a product as it stood against everything that the old represented -both on the left and the 
right. It was also a producer o f new political organizations, parties and movements bom 
out o f the ‘failed revolution’ .^ ®
The leftist opposition grew outside the established communist and social democrat 
institutionalization. Although a great ideological difference was vital within the movement, 
from Maoists to anarchists, the unifying aspect o f these separate wings in Italy was a belief 
, which can also be generalized for the whole 1968, in that the revolution should be a deep 
process o f social and cultural transformation, that the center o f gravity should be outside 
the sphere o f conventional politics with an orientation towards new stmctures o f popular 
control, that the transition to an egalitarian, democratic order would be less a matter o f 
economic crisis than o f conscious, imaginative and bold political activity.^* Especially, the 
last point was a revolutionary break through from the historical materialist conception o f 
the “scientific socialism”, which turned out to be a tendency towards what Marx would 
call “utopian socialism”. In this sense, collective intellectual was favored rather than the 
cadre-based leadership o f the existing political parties which was a mass based, anti- 
vanguardist approach. The conquest o f the state power was given a secondary place, as 
the most important achievement was to transform the relations within the civil society first.
20,'ibid, p. 96.
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This trend also re-constructed the image o f socialism on the basis o f social 
relations, culture and politics as well as economic life. It was inevitable that the post-1968 
organizations and movements would give birth to a different understanding o f politics into 
the agenda, which were heavily influenced by this trend. The formulation o f this were the 
new social movements and the newly formed or effected left parties o f Western Europe 
which are trying to achieve some kind a hegemony, in Gramscian sense, in order to 
transform the society.
The new left and the new social movements both were rooted in the struggle 
against the same general conditions: bureaucratization of authority relations, industrial and 
urban decay, the ecology crisis, the arms race and widespread social anomie. The new 
social movements embraced themes that were already present, in a less developed form, in 
new left radicalism; A popular grass roots insurgency centered largely outside the 
dominant public sphere, an emphasis on qualitative or post-materialist goals, a cultural 
radicalism, demands around collective consumption and the most important o f all, which 
represents a split from the established left partie; the non-classed based identities.^^
As Duverger argued, the communist parties are based on the organizations o f 
cells. The contact o f the cell to another is forbidden as the horizontal link between these 
organs are missing. The horizontal link can only be established with the trade unions and 
youth organizations in order to increase the dominance o f the party over them. Moreover, 
the strict centralization o f the communist parties led their vertical links stronger as the cell
"'Boggs, Dec//«e, p. 193.
-^ibid, p. 207.
^^Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methen & Co Ltd, 1969).
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is only allowed to contact with its section which is the above organization within the 
hierarchy o f the communist parties.
It was just this point that the monolithic understanding o f the communist left was 
widely criticized by the new movements that brought into the discussion o f the existing 
political structures, most importantly political parties. The new social movements 
mobilized the people outside the established organizational framework, not on the basis of 
a “single” issue like class struggle. The main focus turned out to be the politics o f identity 
and politics o f opposition. This also brought its own danger as these differences in turn 
have the potential to become the basis o f ideological differences and barriers. The old 
paradigm was represented by economic growth and distribution that was related to the 
welfare state o f the post-war period.^'* The military and social security were the two 
priorities o f the developed society against the communist threat, that brought the control 
o f the social. Moreover, the material progress and freedom and security o f private 
consumption were the main tools for the society to be more “civilized”, which in turn 
brought the concept o f progress. It was argued that the development process was a linear 
one. In this paradigm, internally organizations appeared to be formal, large scale 
representative entities, while the pluralist or cooporatist interests o f the political party 
competition, which was based on majority rule, were intermediated, externally. The actors 
o f the old paradigm were acting as socioeconomic groups which were involved in 
distributive conflicts. The new paradigm aims at the preservation o f the environment, 
human rights, peace and unalianated forms o f work which was grounded on the autonomy 
o f the personal and identity. The organizations, internally, are informal and spontaneous
'^’David Plotke, “What’s So New About New Social Movements?”, Socialist Review, no 1, pp. 81-102.
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which allows vertical differentiation. Externally, politics is based on protests that are 
formulated in predominantly negative terms. The actors o f this new paradigm are acting on 
behalf o f ascriptive collectivities.^’
The closest thing to the spirit o f the above statements was the establishment o f the 
Green Parties, first in Western Germany and then in other Western European Countries. 
This can be conceptualized as an attempt to re-structure the post-Marxist, post-materialist 
tradition into a party organization and an electoral framework; that can be called as “anti­
party party”. Turning into an organizational institution brought the danger of making 
politics within the established public sphere, which forced these trends to lose ground in 
the grass root radical movements.
The Green Parties, throughout Europe, moved towards being typical social 
democratic parties. Moreover the difference between the SPD and the Green Party eroded 
as the social democrats started to champion green themes in their electoral campaign and 
legislative work. The case was more or less the same in the northern European countries, 
where mainstream parties started emphasizing environmental issues.
On the contrary, the southern parts o f Europe saw a different trend, in which the 
radical left tried to be united within the same party while maintaining their different 
ideological orientations. This is also a tactical approach to the falling trend o f the 
communist parties, that is heavily effected by the assault against the monolithic, 
democratic centralist, old left parties. In Spain, after the communist party split into three 
factions as pro-Moscow, social democrat and the left that was influenced by new left, a 
project called the ‘United Left’ came into existence, which positions itself in the left o f
25,ibid.
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social democracy. The minor left nationalist parties, a pro-Moscow small party and the 
ones that are effected by the local activism of the social movements vitalized themselves in 
the party without getting into the debates about the ideological unification. The 
importance was being there with their different identities without rendering the interest of 
the other. The union have 40,000 members and received 8 percent o f the votes in the last 
elections.^^
In Italy, the Communist Party changed its name and constituted a coalition o f the 
traditional communists, radical and green non-communist radicals. In this sense, the ones 
who left the Communist Party due to the invasion o f Chezchoslavakia and the pro- 
invasionists are in the same party, without changing and realizing their political 
differences.
These projects, just like the Green Parties in the Northern Europe, are trying to 
achieve a structural change within the civil society. This differentiates them both from the 
traditional social democrat and communist parties which try to change the economic 
structure by using the state apparatus. Moreover, in order to overcome the 
bureaucratization o f the organizations, the horizontal links within the parties are 
encouraged. The local activism is another dynamic behind the idea o f these newly founded 
parties, which is mostly implemented by the non-Marxist radicals.
On the contrary, the inadequacy o f the new left and the new social movements to 
constitute a coherent program in order to make changes within the civil society became a 
fact. As the movements organized in the form o f political parties, the more they become a 
part of the established political system. They loose their radicalization as they become vote
26 Boggs, Decline, p. 289.
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oriented parties. Although some parties do not seem to place themselves within the left- 
right paradigm^’, they mostly are placed on the left o f social democracy.
In very general terms, three main trends in Marxism became visible in the 1990s. 
The first one was the revolutionary interpretation of Marxism, which lost its credibility 
with the breakdown o f the Eastern Bloc experience in 1989. Although some political 
parties are strictly tied to their Bolshevik heritage, it is likely that no serious alternative can 
be developed within this line o f Marxism.
The second line o f thought was represented by the social democrat experience o f 
the Western developed countries. As the social democrats lost their ties with Marxism in 
the 1960s, their evolutionary character eroded. They became the parties o f status quo. 
Especially in the 1990s, it is likely that they can not bring new visions, and only slow up 
the process o f the erosion o f the welfare state.
The communist and the social democrat experiences were unable to catch the 
dynamics in three ways. The first one was the inadequacy o f these parties to integrate new 
kinds o f opposition dynamics into their ideological and practical domains. In this respect 
the green, the women and anti-militarist activism could not be incorporated, as they 
became the movement o f the streets. Secondly, with the process o f bureaucratization o f 
the organizational bodies, these parties became just like any other right wing party, in 
which the vertical dimensions o f democracy were strengthened, whereas the horizontal 
relations were discouraged. In other words, they turned into what they fought against. 
Thirdly, the indifference o f these parties, both in terms o f discourse and practical 
experiences from any other political party, alienated a considerable amount o f leftists from
"^For example, the Gennan Green Party sits at the center o f the Bundestaag, although the social democrats
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these organizations. The outcome was a new interpretation o f Marxism with a new 
organizational framework.
The third alternative was developed in the post-1968 period in Europe, as the 
green parties and the left o f the social democrat parties came into existence. The 
significance o f them was the importance that they gave to politics outside the political. In 
this respect, although the parliament was a tool for politics, the street radicalism on the 
basis o f worker, green and peace movements became the means to transform the civil 
societal relations from grass roots. In order to be the organizations o f the grass roots, the 
channels o f democracy were opened in all respects.
This trend is more or less applicable to all parts o f the world. The Worker’s Party 
in Brazil, the United Left in Spain, Refimdazione Communista in Italy, the new left 
experience in Sweden, the PDS and the Greens in Germany should be handled in this 
respect, as they all are the products and the institutionalization o f the new left in global 
sense. What aimed was to lose ties with the bureaucratic heritage o f Marxism and to re­
invite the radical character o f leftism into the picture.
sit on the left, whereas the conservatives sit on the right of the parliament.
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CHAPTER III
The Road to Unifîcation: The Transformation of the
Socialist Left in Turkey
This chapter will focus on the general history of Marxism in Turkey from the late 
Ottoman period till the establishment o f Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve 
Dayamşma Partisi, ÖDP) in 1996. As there existed 49 factions in the year 1980, it would 
be impossible to investigate all o f them in a single chapter. Rather, the main parties and 
organizations that are related to ÖDP will be taken into consideration mainly. In this 
respect, only the Communist Party o f Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP), Worker 
Party o f Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TİP), Socialist Worker Party o f Turkey (Türkiye 
Sosyalist İşçi Partisi, TSİP), the Liberation movement (Kurtuluş), Revolutionary Path 
(Devrimci Yol, Dev-Yol) and Communist Labor Party o f Turkey (Türkiye Komünist 
Emek Partisi, TKEP) will be taken into account in the 1970s and 1980s as these 
organizations are directly linked to the formation o f the ÖDP. Moreover, the ideological 
orientations o f the pre-1971 TİP, the People Liberation Party-Front o f Turkey (Türkiye 
Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, THKP-C) and People Liberation Army o f Turkey (Türkiye 
Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, THKO) will also be analyzed, as all o f them are one way or 
another related to the organizations o f the 1970s’ and the 1980s’. Although there might 
seem to be displacing the details o f the trends o f Marxism in Turkey, it would be better to 
mention other divisions, as only in this respect, the unification o f the Marxist trends in 
Turkey under ÖDP can be conceived. In the last part o f this chapter, a short analysis o f the
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socialist left, both in the 1970s and the 1980s will be given, which would try to label the 
socialists left o f Turkey in terms o f its general characteristics.^*
Unlike Europe, the history of socialism both in the Ottoman and the Republican 
period is not rich. The first Ottoman socialist organization, Ottoman Socialist Party 
(Osmanli Sosyalist Fırkası) was founded in 1910 in Istanbul and joined the Second 
International. In 1913, its activities were banned by the government of Union and Progress 
(İttihat ve Terakki). As the First World War broke out, the left was suppressed by the 
government. It was only in 1918 that the left wing intellectuals headed by Şefik Hüsnü 
Deymer founded the Worker and Peasant Socialist Party o f Turkey (Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi 
Sosyalist Fırkası). It tried to constitute a left front, but failed to achieve it.
On the other hand the TKP was founded in 1920 by Mustafa Suphi and his 
followers. Due to the state o f emergency, which was the outcome o f Sheikh Said 
Rebellion, it was closed, and its supporters were arrested. Until 1946, except for the illegal 
TKP, there was no socialist party in existence. Following the transition to multi-party rule 
in 1945, TKP tried to legalize itself Due to the Plennum decision o f the TKP, the 
independent socialist Esat Adil Müstecaplıoğlu founded the Socialist Party o f Turkey 
(Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi) in 1946. Meanwhile, another TKP member. Şefik Hüsnü did not 
recognize the Plennum decision and founded another organization called Turkish Socialist 
Laborer and Peasant Party (Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi). At the time there 
appeared an attempt from the basis of the two parties to be unified, the government closed 
them. Meanwhile, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, who was imprisoned for the 1938 navy riot, got out
^*The list at the end o f the thesis would be useful for following the parties and organizations.
34
of prison and in 1954, founded the Fatherland Party (Vatan Partisi). The aim o f the party
was:
...to put the interests o f the nation above those of the state in order to bring 
real freedom, and put an end to the anti-democratic laws, to start the second 
Kuva-i Milliye movement against unemployment and inflation, to start the leap 
for heavy industry...
In the last day of 1957, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı and 38 members o f the party were 
arrested on the grounds that the party was a communist organization, which brought the 
end o f the party.
It was only in February 13, 1961 the Worker Party o f Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, 
TİP) was founded by 12 İstanbul trade union leaders. They did not attract any attention 
till Mehmet Ali Aybar became the president o f the party. At the beginning, the working 
class did not pay attention to this new socialist party, as the non-worker strata were 
dominant within the party.
In the first congress o f TİP, on 9-10 Feb, 1964, Aybar stated that socio- economic 
development was only possible through a non-capitalist path o f development because the 
state was given a dominant role in the planned but mixed economy. According to him, the 
banks, foreign trade, insurance companies would be nationalized and the private sector 
would be re-shaped in order to make progress. TİP should win the power to fight and 
change the system within the legality of the 1961 constitution. Another important figure in 
the party, Behice Boran, stressed the importance of political independence as well as
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economic self-sufficiency. In the adopted program, the word “socialist” was nowhere to be 
found. In the 1965 elections TİP sent 15 MPs to the parliament, which was the only 
success o f the socialist party tradition in Turkey as in the preceding years, none o f the 
legal socialist organizations could have attracted this amount of support on the basis of 
counted votes.
In the period between 1961-1965, TİP adopted the non-capitalist way o f 
development. In the summer o f 1966, Aybar stressed the importance o f the indivisibility of 
the national liberation struggle and the struggle for socialism. In this sense, the second 
national liberation movement would be connected to building socialism in the country. 
Meanwhile, Mihri Belli who was an ex-member o f the TKP formulated the two staged 
revolution o f Turkey in the Second Congress o f TIP as opposed to Aybar’s formulation. 
Belli argued that first the full national independence o f Turkey should be maintained, and it 
was after that the socialist program could be applied. In this sense, the stage o f national 
independence would be a struggle against the feudal and imperialist forces. It was stated 
that Turkey was a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, in which the capitalist relations 
were weak in character. Due to the special conjuncture of Turkey, the main contradiction 
was not between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but between imperialism -namely the 
American imperialism-, and the “enslaved” Turkish people. In this sense, the aim would be 
a national democratic revolution (Milli Demokratik Devrim, MDD).^** The people were 
considered as the secondary force in the first stage o f revolution, as the civil-military elites 
were given a dominant role. In this sense, the first duty o f the proletarian socialists was to 
make national democratic revolution and then the socialist revolution.
^^m in Karaca, “Türkiye’de Legal Sosyalist Partiler”. Gelenek. No 52 (!996), pp. 93-98.
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The first ideological split that was defined in clear-cut boundaries was in the Third 
Congress o f TİP in 1968. In the congress three groups emerged within the party. The first 
one was the supporters of Aybar. Aybar, without consulting on the organs o f the party, 
condemned the Soviet invasion of Prague in 1968. The “Aren-Boran clique” *^ accused 
Aybar o f forming an authoritarian dominance within the party. They argued that Aybar 
was not acting as a scientific socialist, as Aybar was for a peaceful transition to the 
socialist society. On the other hand, both groups supported the indivisibility o f the socialist 
and national democratic character o f the Turkish revolution as opposed to the supporters 
o f Mihri Belli, who became the third part in the debates within the party. Although Aybar 
and Aren-Boran’s understanding o f socialist revolution was accepted in the third congress, 
it was Belli’s understanding that would influence the armed struggle tradition of Turkish 
Marxism.
In the 1969 elections, TİP could only send two MPs to the parliament as the 
election system was changed in order to avoid the small parties to form groups within the 
parliament. After this election, the socialist left lost its confidence in the parliamentary 
means to achieve power and radicalized. Idea Clubs Federation (Fikir Kulüpleri 
Federasyonu) changed its name to Revolutionary Youth (Devrimci-Gençlik, Dev-Genc). 
The supporters o f the socialist revolution o f TİP lost their ground in the organization, and 
the national democratic character o f the revolution became more emphasized. In this 
respect, four main trends in Turkish Marxism can be stated. The first three, as analyzed
‘^^ Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi vol. 7 (Istanbul; İletişim Yayınlan, 1988), p. 2144. 
^'Referred as the Aren-Boran clique (Aren-Boran Kliği) because o f the surnames o f Sadim Aren and 
Behice Boran, who were the important figures of the opposition within the party.
37
below bom out o f the cleavages within the Dev-Genç, whereas the fourth represents the 
continuation o f TİP.
The first movement that emerged out o f Revolutionary Youth was known as 
Proletarian Revolutionary Light (Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık, PDA). They had a 
superiority among the other movements in ideological terms at the beginning o f the 
Revolutionary Youth days. From these days onward, they strictly stayed as Maoists. 
Before the 1971 intervention o f the military junta, they founded the Revolutionary Worker 
and Peasant Party o f Turkey (Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi, TİIKP), which was an 
illegal organization. There occurred a split within the movement in 1972, as a group which 
was headed by Ibrahim Kaypakkaya left and formed Communist Party o f Turkey-Marxist 
Leninist (Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marxist Leninist, TKP-ML). The main difference of 
TTTKP from TKP-ML became cmcial as the latter formed its armed division called 
Worker and Peasant Liberation Army o f Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu, 
TİKKO). TİIKP group founded Worker and Peasant Party o f Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Köylü 
Partisi, TİKP) in 1979. In 1988, Socialist Party (Sosyalist Parti), under the leadership o f 
Ferit İlsever, was founded by the supporters o f PDA. It aimed to achieve a unity among 
the socialist left but failed to do so, and later turned its name into Worker Party (İşçi 
Partisi, İP ), this time headed by Doğu Perinçek.
The second movement was named as People Liberation Army o f Turkey (Türkiye 
Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, THKO), that was popular in İstanbul, which was mainly founded 
by the members o f Revolutionary Student Union (Devrimci Öğrenci Birliği, DÖB). The 
significance o f this movement was firstly to form a military organization. According to 
them, the political organization was to emerge out o f an armed struggle. Secondly, the
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popular figures among the students were in the leadership cadre o f the organization.^^ 
After the amnesty o f 1973, the remaining cadres o f the organization got out o f prison. A 
debate started within the followers o f the THKO, as a split occurred between two groups. 
The first group that emerged out of the debate had Maoist orientations, and referred to as 
the People’s Liberation (Halkın Kurtuluşu). Later, they adopted the views o f Enver Hoca 
o f Albania and formed the illegal Revolutionary Communist Party o f Turkey (Türkiye 
Devrimci Komünist Partisi, TDKP) in 1980. In the 1990s, the TDKP turned itself into 
Labor Party (Emek Partisi). As it was closed by the state security court, the party changed 
its name to Labor’s Party (Emeğin Partisi).
The second group that emerged out o f the debates within the THKO was the 
Communist Labor Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Emek Partisi, TKEP). The party 
was founded on illegal basis in the First o f May, 1980. One o f the aims of the party was to 
form the unity o f the communists in Turkey. They declared their Leninist orientations and 
formed the Communist Party of Kurdistan (Partiye Komüniste Kurdistan), which was an 
autonomous organization of the Party, but was still the part o f the local branches that were 
existing in the Turkish part o f the country. In this respect, from 1980 to 1989, TKEP 
organized three united general congresses with the other branch o f the party, and seven 
plennum meetings were held.^^ The Partiye Kommuniste Kurdistan, on the other hand held 
two individual congresses. All o f these activities were held on illegal basis. It was only in 
1994 that the TKEP would be legalized with other several socialist organizations under 
the name o f United Socialist Party (Birleşik Sosyalist Parti, BSP).
^^The three important fiigures, Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan, were later executed, being 
the only ones who were sentenced to death by the government of Nihat Erim.
^^Teslim Töre, “TKEP”. Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi. vol. 7 p. 2266.
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The last and the most important movement, that was bom out o f the Dev-Genç 
was People Liberation Party-Front o f Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi, 
THKP-C), which was headed by Mahir Çayan. The importance o f the movement became 
very cmcial in the late 1970s, as the most widely supported socialist organizations o f the 
period, that were Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş, claimed to be the followers o f the THKP-C 
thesis. In this respect, the thesis o f Çayan need to be explained, as both Kurtuluş and Dev- 
Yol are two o f the major groups being represented in ÖDP.
Unlike the other movements, THKP-C stressed the importance of both theory and 
practice. For example, THKO has never had an intention to develop a theoretical side to 
their movement. On the other hand both movements represented a new interpretation o f 
the national democratic movement o f Mihri Belli that started from the concept o f 
“people’s war”. The determinant factor of one movement, according to Çayan, to be 
revisionist was the importance of the issue o f armed stmggle, and how it was conceived 
and analyzed by that specific group.
The crisis o f socialism at the end o f 1960s was seen as the outcome o f the pacifist 
tendencies o f the Marxist movement, worldwide. This pacifist understanding was due to 
the threat o f a nuclear war. In order to overcome this status quo, just like in the Cuban 
experience, any movement should not put the guns aside. In this sense, the approach to 
violence was not taken with a utilitarian conception, but it was conceived as a “must”, in 
order to break the chain o f capitalism.
The split between the national democratic revolutionaries and the group, which 
would form THKP-C later was due to some ideological differences. Çayan and his 
followers accused Belli o f acting as a pacifist, both in the national and international basis.
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On the other hand, Belli’s conception o f the incidents o f 15-16 June '^* greatly differed from 
the conception o f Çayan’s. The radicalization o f the workers in Istanbul decreased the 
importance o f them in the eyes o f Belli, as he took them as a threat for a united front 
which would be composed of the military-civil elites, petty bourgeoisie and the peasants. 
As the military elite’s conception o f Turkish society was classless, they might see a threat 
in the incidents, which would harm the front. On the other hand Çayan took the 
demonstrations as a sign for the fulfillment o f the objective and subjective conditions of 
the working class in Turkey. The only thing missing was the lack o f a vanguard, 
revolutionary party. His organization understanding was from top to bottom, in a Leninist 
model, in which he calls it democratism. The laborers need not to be the majority in the 
first stages o f the party, as the leaders o f the organization may be coming from petty 
bourgeois origins.
Çayan accused Doğan Avcıoğlu^^ on the other hand o f repeating the economist 
thesis o f Second International, which defended that the proletariat can not lead the 
revolutionary movement. In this sense, the national democratic revolution for Çayan was 
the continuation o f Lenin and Trotsky’s thesis o f the post-1905 period, as they put 
emphasis on the ideological vanguard position o f the working class in the coming 
revolution, which would be bourgeois democratic in character, but would evolve into a 
proletarian revolution automatically. Çayan generalized national democratic revolution for
'^'in 15-16 June 1970, thousands o f workers demonstrated and fought with the police and the military 
against a law, which would harm their right to organize that was trying to be implemented by the AP 
govermnent.
^^Doğan Avcıoğlu was the ideologist o f the magazines Yön and Türk Solu. His famous book “Türkiye’nin 
Düzeni”, influenced young leftists. Throughout his life he never considered himself as a Marxist and 
supported a military takeover.
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all colonial and semi-colonial countries, as he thought that the world capitalism was in the 
final crisis.
On the other hand, against the guerrilla tactics o f Regris Debray, who emphasized 
the militaristic side o f the movement and blamed the urban cities as bourgeois, Çayan 
stressed the political side o f the movement -although, armed struggle was a must. 
Moreover, he was against the distinction that the rural was proletariat and the urban was 
bourgeois, as it was not a Leninist statement. He argued that the route o f the revolution 
would be from the rural to the urban, just because the proletariat was inadequate in terms 
o f quantity. But this, according to Çayan, did not mean that the proletariat would not be 
guiding the movement ideologically, although the urban was seen as in the hands of 
imperialism.
The heritage o f Çayan^® and his followers deeply effected the cadres that were 
imprisoned after the military intervention o f 1971. Coming from the roots o f THKP-C, 
several organizations were formed. The most important o f them were Dev-Yol, Kurtuluş, 
Marxist Leninist Armed Propoganda Unit (Marxist Leninist Silahlı Propoganda Birliği, 
MLSPB), THKP-C Emergencists (THKP-C Acilciler) and Revolutionary Left (Devrimci 
Sol, Dev-Sol). Among them only the Dev-Yol and the Kurtuluş would be taken into 
account, as they are the only two organizations that joined the ÖDP.
In 1976, the Revolutionary Youth Associations Organizations was founded in 
Ankara by Ankara Democratic High Student Associations, Ankara High Student 
Associations, Istanbul High Student Culture Association, Istanbul High Student
March 30th, 1972, Çayan and liis 10 followers were killed in Kizildere, except Ertuğrul Kürkçü, who 
is now a member of ÖDP.
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Association and Erzurum High Student Association.^’ The aim o f the organization was to 
stand against the rising trend o f the radical right. In other words, “the problems were taken 
not as student problems, but as a problem o f organizing against fascism” .^ *
In May the First 1977, the magazine Revolutionary Path (Devrimci Yol) started to 
be published, and sold nearly 100.000 copies^^, which was the greatest number among 
other organization or party magazines. They followed the thesis o f Mahir Çayan, but tried 
to vitalize the theory by emphasizing different aspects. The thesis o f Çayan was tried to be 
re-incorporated which would not be based on a dogmatic conception. In this respect 
‘Tatsa'*® was both a critique and a continuation o f Kizildere”.'** For example Resistance 
Committees (Direniş Komiteleri) was a different understanding o f organizing the masses 
against rising fascism. As “...fighting against fascistic terror should be taken into account 
as a problem o f revolution”'*’, the main theme o f them was to unify the laborers in a self- 
defense organization. These committees would in turn provide the basis o f the coming 
government, that would serve as the Soviets in the Russian Revolution in 1917. On the 
other hand, another significance o f the committees, was that they were open to people 
coming from Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, CHP) and even National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP). The only 
commonality between them was being against the fascist attacks.'*^
^^İnönü Alpat, Randevuyu Dağa Verdik, (Ankara: Bireşim Yayınlan, 1996), p .l7 .
^*ibid, p. 17.
Ahmet Samim, “Sol”, Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye, (İstanbul; Belge Yayınlan, 1990), p. 178.
'*°A small town in the Black Sea region. The independent candidate o f Dev-Yol won the local election in 
the late 1970s. Just before the 1980 military intervention, the state forces organized an operation and 
arrested all revolutionaries in the region.
'’’Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, “Devrimci Yol Üzerine Notlar”, Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler 
Ansikopedisi, vol 7, p. 2250.
''^ id , p. 2250.
"'^Rafet Ballı. Sosyalist Sol Konuşuyor. (İstanbul; Cem Yayınlan, 1989) p. 101.
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Another significance o f Dev-Yol was the analysis that the confontrations within the 
society were evolving into a civil war. In this sense, the armed struggle could only be 
realized, if the masses would be incorporated into the fight.
Moreover, there always appeared a demand to turn the organization into a party 
structure, as the history o f Dev-Yol can be called as “a history o f trying to become a 
party” . As stated “the things that were won would be partial, as long as a party, which 
would be a vanguard-fighter organization, can not be realized”.'*^  On the other hand, it was 
also argued that, “ ...because o f the subjective circumstances, Dev-Yol could not develop 
a party which would lead the people” .T h e r e  was not a pre-given party model in the 
writings that appeared in the Dev-Yol magazine, as the party would evolve in the existing 
situation. The committees would be the front organizations o f the emerging party 
organization.
The Kurtuluş movement, on the other hand, tried to bring a new outlook to 
Marxism in the 1970s. It was in 1975 that the major split came into existence with what 
was known then as the Dev-Yol supporters and the Kurtuluş movement. The supporters 
o f Kurtuluş accused the THKP-C for not paying attention to the evolutionary side o f the 
revolution. Çayan, according to them disregarded the importance o f organizing in grass 
root level, which was a distinct reality within itself, apart from the political revolution. By 
attacking THKP-C for overemphasizing the importance o f Kemalism, they attacked the 
Kemalists for being chauvinists. The revolution o f Turkey would be an anti-oligarchic, 
anti-imperialist in its character.
"' '^Terörizm ve Anarşi Değil, Faşist Terör ve Faşizme Karşı Mücadele, Devrimci Yol Dergisinden 
Seçmeler, (İstanbul: Gökkuşağı, 1996), p.461.
45ibid, 461.
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In 1976, the magazine, Liberation Socialist Magazine (Kurtuluş Sosyalist Dergi, 
KSD) started to be published. At the end o f the 1970s, the theoretical magazine o f the 
movement was selling 12,000 copies, while the weekly published magazine sold twice as 
much as the theoretical magazine.'*’ In the first Congress in 1979, there appeared two main 
orientations within the movement. The first group that emerged out o f the congress 
argued that the working class should be taken as the basis in organizing, but on the other 
hand other non-working class elements, meaning the Kurdish dynamic, should not be 
disregarded also. On the other hand, the second group emphasized the importance o f 
organizing only in the working class, and argued that “the importance o f fighting against 
fascism would be marginalized, which would make it a waste o f time and energy” .'** In the 
post-1980 period, the latter group left the movement, and started to publish a magazine 
called Socialist Worker (Sosyalist İşçi) in Europe.'*^ The first group founded a new 
organization called Liberation Organization o f Turkey and North Kurdistan (Türkiye ve 
Kuzey Kürdistan Kurtuluş Örgütü).
In the late 1970s, the movement stressed the importance o f a unity within the 
Marxist left o f Turkey. It was argued that the theoretical debates could only be realized on 
the basis o f practice, which would in turn bring the cooperation among the socialists. Even 
the existed situation in the pre-1980 Turkey signified a revolutionary party to be
^^Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, “Notlar”, p. 2251.
Ahmet Samim, “Sol”.
“’^ Mahir Sayın, “Kurtuluş Hareketi ve Türkiye ve Kuzey Kürdistan Kurtuluş Örgütü”, Sosyalizm ve 
Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, vol 7, p. 2262.
‘’®This group became known with their Trotskyist (mainly the followers of Tony Cliff) tendencies and 
founded the Socialist Worker Party (Sosyalist İşçi Partisi), in April 1997.
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constituted. In this sense, the aim was to unite the socialists in a single revolutionary party, 
that would maintain the unity o f the movement, only if it was rooted on the class basis.
Both Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş movements approached critically to the Chinese and 
the Sovietic models o f socialism, which made them the independents o f the Turkish 
Marxism in the 1970s. Unlike the other movements, they emphasized Turkey’s own path 
to socialism, by not legitimizing their thesis on the division o f the international socialist 
arena between the Sovietic, Chinese, Albanian, Cuban, Yugoslavian cases.
Apart from the three division, which were mainly the PDA, THKO and THKP-C 
within Dev-Genç in the 1970s, the heritage o f TİP in terms o f legal political parties came 
into existence. Unlike the independents such as Kurtuluş and Dev-Yol, most o f these 
parties were pro-Soviet organizations in ideological terms.
The first legal socialist political party o f the post-1971 period was the Socialist 
Worker Party o f Turkey (Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi, TSİP), which was founded in June 
lô***, 1974. Just like most o f the other socialist organizations, the party declared the 
importance o f the unity of the socialists in the second congress that was held in 1976. With 
its pro-Sovietic orientations, the party supported the detante policy. The TSİP accused the 
first TİP by acting within the limits o f bourgeois democracy. According to them, “the 
struggle should exceed the limits o f legalism, that would incorporate the struggle for 
independence with socialism”.^’ By supporting the socialist revolution against the national 
democratic revolution, they accused the followers o f the latter by overemphasizing the
^°Erdal Kara, Saim Koç, Mahir Sayın, M. Yavuz, ’’Geçmişin Değerlendirilmesi ve Öncü Savaşı”, 
Sosyalist Solun Birlik Serüveninden Bir Kesit, (İstanbul; Devinim Yayınlan, 1995) pp. 8-12.
Ahmet Kaçmaz, “TSİP”, Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, vol 7, p. 2258.
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importance o f the military. In the 1977 local elections, the party won 28,850 votes. In the 
elections o f 1979, the party increased its votes to 65,135 (1,31%).^^
The other pro-Soviet party that emerged out o f the 1970s was Behice Boran’s 
TİP. After the party was closed in the military intervention o f 1971, the second TİP was 
founded by the followers o f Behice Boran in April 1975. It was argued that the divisions in 
the socialist left was not vital in the working class. The aim o f the party was to organize 
the unity o f the working class in Turkey. The party was a pro-Soviet organization that 
supported the detente policy o f USSR. It was argued that the policy o f peaceful mutual 
existence worked for the benefit o f the revolutions in the third world, as the US was 
unable to intervene because o f a threat o f a nuclear war. Another significance o f TİP 
policy was to “encourage the university students to confront the police with the fascists” .
While mentioning political parties with Sovietic tendencies, the most important 
pro-Soviet organization o f the time, that is TKP should also be taken into account. Unlike 
TİP and TSİP, TKP was still illegal. In this sense, the history o f TICP from the 1920s to 
1990s can be regarded as a history o f an attempt to become legalized. Till 1973, TKP 
defended a non-capitalist way o f development in Turkey. After 1973, a fusion o f the 
national democratic revolution and the progressive democracy thesis started to be 
emphasized in their thesis. According to them. Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi, CHP) should be supported in the first stage. The CHP government, when it 
comes to power would legalize TKP, and in the coming elections, TKP would form a 
group in the parliament. Realizing the strength o f TKP, CHP would move towards the left 
o f the center and would form a coalition with TKP. In this second stage, the national
52;·ibid, p. 2259.
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democratic revolution would be acliieved. In the last stage, as the majority would be 
obtained in the parliament, the system would be transformed to socialism.
The thesis o f TKP could never be realized. Moreover, TiCP lost the popularity that 
it gained in the Confederation o f Revolutionary Worker Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikalan 
Konfederasyonu, DİSK). The other left organizations that tried to find a place in the 
confederation were strongly opposed by the TKP, which decreased the effectivity and the 
number o f the leftists (including both the followers o f TKP and the others) in the 
organization.
The 1980 intervention put an end to the rising trend o f socialism in Turkey. All o f 
the political parties, as well as organizations were closed by the military junta. It was after 
1980 that new ideological and political orientations were started to be developed within 
the socialist left o f Turkey.
Nearly 1000 people were arrested as being accused o f Dev-Yol members, and 
nearly 36 cases were taken into account in the post-1980 courts o f Turkey. As Oguzhan 
Müftüoğlu argued, the failure o f Dev-Yol was due to the fact that the amateur relations 
were not transformed, which meant that the revolutionary platform was not accomplished. 
This was largely because o f the failure o f the movement to turn itself into an organized 
revolutionary party.
Following the junta o f 1980, thousands o f Dev-Yol supporters left the urban areas 
and tried to establish guerrilla warfare. The first document o f Dev-Yol following the 
intervention came out in November 1980. Generally, it was argued that the unity o f left
Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, vol 7, p. 2234. 
^''Ballı, Sosyalist Sol Konuşuyor, p. 79.
’^For fiırther details, see İnönü Alpat’s Randevuyu Dağa Verdik.
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was seen as a must against the junta, and it was believed that the military would soon leave 
the power. The second document came out in January 1981. This time, the power o f the 
military was more realized, and it was stated that the number o f the members o f the 
Resistance Committees should be decreased. Moreover, the rural guerrilla movement 
started to be taken more seriously. The most important political maneuver was the 
establishment o f a ffont^^, in order to struggle against the military in August 1982. It was 
composed o f Dev-Yol, TKEP, Kurdistan Worker Party (Partiye Kerkeriye Kurdistan, 
PKK), Socialist Fatherland Party (Sosyalist Vatan Partisi, S VP), supporters o f Mitin Belli, 
Worker’s Voice (İşçinin Sesi)^’ and several smaller groups. Moreover, TIKKO joined the 
front not as a participant, but only as a viewer. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, and the 
guerrilla camps could no longer be used by Dev-Yol, which jeopardized the existence o f 
the organization.
Meanwhile, Taner Akçam^*, who was a member o f the center committee, proposed 
a different argument. He thought that the movement was unable to understand the new 
forms o f class struggle in Turkey. According to him, Dev-Yol could not be a part in the 
political arena o f Turkey, if the same thesis o f Dev-Yol would be used. He formalized his 
own thesis in a 32 paged document in Germany, in which he emphasized a break through 
from the economist interpretations o f Marxism, which condemned the old thesis as 
“scientific socialism is out o f date, it would only remain as a political utopia”.
^®The name of the front was The United Struggle Front Against Fascism (Faşizme Karşı Birleşik Direniş 
Cephesi).
57t k p ’s English division (İşçinin Sesi).
^^Taner Akçam left Turkey as early as 1977, due to political reasons.
®^“Terörizm ve Anarşi D eğ il...”, Devrimci Yol Dergisinden Seçmeler, p.461.
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The remaining years in Dev-Yol saw the organization split, generally, in three main 
parts. The first one was represented by Taner Akçam and his followers in Germany, who 
argued that a new organization should be established on the local and mass grounds, as 
Dev-Yol could not meet the demands in Turkey. The second wing was also present in 
Germany, Revolutionary Worker Movement (Devrimci İşçi Hareketi, DİH), which 
emphasized the importance o f Dev-Yol, without changing the basic thesis and the 
organizational structure o f the movement. The third part was mainly constituted by the 
middle way approaches that was mainly the ideas o f the prisoners in Turkey. This third 
party became significantly important as they started a debate within the movement in 
Turkey, which would in return bring the co-existence of different views in a single left
party.
The debates started within Dev-Yol in 1992 as a document was submitted to the
sympathizers. In the document, it was stated that the left in the world transformed itself 
into a new direction. As Miiftuoglu argued “the traditional left has eroded: in the real 
existing socialisms, the ruler and the ruled relationship was institutionalized”.*^® Moreover, 
it was argued that the debates within Dev-Yol should be handled in the grass roots o f the 
organization, not within the realm o f the leadership o f the movement. The most important 
argument o f the document was that there was an attempt from Dev-Yol to include the 
other segments o f the left in Turkey. The debates should firstly focus on the theoretical 
issues o f the transformation both in the world and in Turkey. By these guidelines that 
would be incorporated from the theoretical debates, the practical solutions should be 
handled.
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In the first round o f the debates, it was seen that Dev-Yol could no longer 
constitute itself as a homogeneous organization, as there appeared different 
understandings o f the process o f change by different segments o f the movement. But 
generally, it was conceived that a new form of revolutionary movement should be 
achieved. In Melih Pekdemir’s words “what remained behind from the romanticism o f Che 
was: to rebel. Either you become a reformist, they would give it to you piece by piece, or 
be a revolutionary and take it as piece by peace” .^ *
The debates soon evolve into the question o f organizing as a legal political party. 
On this issue, Ibrahim Sevimli from the W orker’s Voice (İşçinin Sesi) stated that the 
importance should be given to what and how the people see Dev-Yol as an organization. 
In other words “It is not a question o f legality or illegality, it is a question o f a legitimacy 
in the eyes o f the public” .^  ^ On the other hand there were attempts to incorporate 
different movements into the organization. In this sense, the questions o f women, 
environment, and national questions should also be analyzed and taken into account on the 
basis o f class struggle.^^ Moreover, the question o f revolution started to be conceived not 
as a one-night incident, but as a gradual process. This approach could be taken into 
account in parallelity to the Resistance Committees of the pre-1980 period. The building 
o f socialism would be starting from within the system, which would root itself with the 
power organizations. A critical approach to the Sovietic model o f socialism was re-
“^Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, “Geleneksel Sol Anlayış İflas Etti”. 2000’e Doğru, 9th August 1992, year 6, no 38,
p. 8.
®'ibid, p. 14.
®^“Divan Konuştu Söz Bizde”, 2000’e Doğru, 6th December 1992, year 6, no 49.
“ Mahmut Memduh Uyan, “Tartışma Süreci, Geçmiş ve Gelecek Üzerine...”, Tartışma Süreci Yazılan 2, 
(İstanbul: Bireşim Yayınlan, 1993), pp. 25-60.
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vitalized with the restoration o f capitalism in the real existing socialist countries. The 
struggle o f social change would be in the realm o f democracy.
While the change in Dev-Yol could even be analyzed from the outside, the same 
observation could be made for the Kurtuluş movement in the 1980s. In the disorganized 
environment o f the Marxist left o f Turkey, the movement stressed the importance o f a 
unity, on the basis o f accepting the differences between the groups. The reason o f this was 
the observation that none o f the groups had hegemony in the 1980s in order to unite the 
Marxist left. It was demanded that “The existing organizations would tie themselves to the 
newly established organization as the latter exceeds their limits and a consensus 
appears” .^ '* This understanding, according to them, would automatically bring unity on the 
basis o f action, while preserving the differences among the organizations.
While the transformations were deeply felt in the Dev-Yol and the Kurtuluş 
Movements, the Sovietic party organizations started to transform, and adapt themselves to 
the newly emerged international conjuncture. The turning point in the history o f TKP and 
Tip was the agreement o f unity between these two organizations in 1988.^^ The name of 
the newly established party was United Communist Party o f Turkey (Türkiye Birleşik 
Komünist Partisi, TBKP). On October 10, Boran died, and the mass support in her funeral 
was conceived as a green light for the political refugees o f TBKP to return to Turkey.
It was stated that the newly established party would try to be a mass, democratic 
political party. While struggling for democracy -as it was not conceived as a means but an 
end in itself, which would remain as the target- different social classes were to be
64Kara, Sosyalist Solun Birlik Serüveninden Bir Kesit, p. 41.
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cooperated with.^^ Within this realm, the term democracy meant as a multi-class, multi 
ideological, multi-party regime as the president o f the party Nihat Sargın and the general 
secretor, Nabi Yağcı^^ has stated. According to Haydar Kutlu, Leninism came to and end, 
and should be overcame. Taking different types o f antagonisms on the basis o f class 
struggle, was a mistake yesterday, as it was a mistake in that time.^* In the draft o f the 
party program, there appeared the acceptation o f a democratic variant o f capitalism, which 
was a new political orientation. In this sense, the state should be civilized, and a re­
constitution o f democracy should be vitalized. The concept o f class interests was replaced 
by human interests, as the modem Turkey should find its place in the world on respectable 
grounds. As Haydar Kutlu stated “the age o f imperialism was over, as a new age 
emerged in the world” .™ Moreover, the unity o f the socialists in Turkey was taken as the 
mission, which in turn meant that it was not only a project o f the unity o f TİP and TKP.
On the other hand Sadun Aren and some individual socialists’* started on a project 
o f a new socialist party. As Aren has stated “the newly established party would be a mass, 
civilized party”™, which would reject the Stalinist legacy that would unite the left under a 
legal, pluralist, peaceful and humanist project.™ The TBKP dissolved itself in the congress 
that was held in 12-14 January, and stated that Socialist Unity Party (Sosyalist Birlik
The significance of the project o f unification can only be understood, if  it is remembered that at the end 
of 1970s, some members o f TİP were dismissed from the party. The accusation was that they demanded a 
unification between the TKP and TİP.
®®Deniz Kavukçuoğlu, “Çağdaş Bir Komünist Parti”, 2000'e Doğru, June 12th 1988, Year 2, no 25, pp. 
32-33.
®^Nihat Sargın, “Demokrasi Süreci Gelişiyor”, 2000’e Doğru, October 23rd 1988, Year 2, no 44, p. 22. 
®*Haydar Kutlu, “TBKP Misyonu Sürecektir”, 2000 'e Doğru, May 13th 1990, Year 4, no 18, pp. 28-30. 
®®ibid, 28-30.
^^2000 'e Doğru, December 30th, 1990, year 8, no 52, pp. 58-61.
’^Oral Çalışlar, Serhat Baygan, Aziz Nesin, Korkut Boratav, Haluk Gerger, Muzaffer İlhan Erdost, Murat 
Belge.
^^ “Sadun Aren’den Yasal Parti Girişimi”, 2000’e Doğru, March 4th 1990, year 4, no 10, p. 27.
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Partisi, SBP) should be the place for the socialists to go. In 15th January o f 1991, SBP 
was founded by TBKP, TSİDP, some members who left the Socialist Party, the four MPs, 
who left the Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP) and 
the individual socialists. In this sense, it was the first socialist party to have deputies in the 
parliament in Turkey after 1971.
It was the first time that the party with wings came into existence with this project. 
By defining its existence on Marxist grounds, it showed the possibility o f a project of 
unity, and the most important o f all, it did not conceive its being as an end in the unity 
project, as it did not place itself in the center o f the left.’'*
Following the unity o f different organizations o f the Marxist left in Turkey at the 
beginning o f the 1990s, there appeared another important event, which was the 
Kuruçeşme Meetings. Except Dev-Yol’ ,^ different segments o f the socialist left o f Turkey 
joined the meetings. Two main orientations became visible after the meetings: The first 
one was a Marxist party that was open to the social democrats who want to be a part in 
the project, which was symbolized by SBP. The other one was called the Revolutionary 
Socialist Block (Devrimci Sosyalist Blok, DSB)’ ,^ that participated in the 1991 general 
elections, on the basis o f individual candidates.”  Parallel to the Kuruçeşme Meetings, 
other meetings were held in Europe also. The significance o f the meetings according to 
Atilla Aytemur was as follows: “all the factions o f the left stands on the same ground, the
^^2000'e Doğru, March 18th 1990, year 4, no 2, pp. 20-21.
^''Atilla Aytemur, ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor: Partileşme, Ütopya, Sorunlar, öneriler, (İstanbul; Güncel 
Yayıncılık, 1996), pp. 23-49.
^^Dev-Yol as an organization did not participate in the meetings, as there never was an organization in 
very classical sense in the 1990s. Moreover, the leader cadres o f the movement such as Oğuzhan 
Muflüoğlu, Bülent Forta and Melih Pekdemir were still in prison.
®^It was constituted o f individual candidates from Freedom World (özgürlük Dünyası), Labor’s Flag 
(Emeğin Bayrağı), Kurtuluş, and Socialist Turkey Party (Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi).
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truth is not in the hands o f a monopolistic group, unifying the left under one roof is a must 
and a possibility and the form o f this organization would be a pluralistic model” .’*
In the local elections following the general elections o f 1991, SBP joined its forces 
with Kurtuluş, New Course (Yeni Yol)’ ,^ Labor (Emek)*®, Socialist Politics (Sosyalist 
Politika)*’ and the individuals that called themselves as Politics Between Floors 
(Zeminlerarasi Politika) and named the block as United Socialist Alternative (Birleşik 
Sosyalist Alternatif, BSA). The bloc turned itself into a political party in June 1994, as 
United Socialist Party (Birleşik Sosyalist Parti, BSP). The regulation o f the party realized 
the different platforms that were composed o f different organizations, which enabled the 
platforms to be represented in the party organs, regardless o f the sizes o f them. One o f the 
best signifier o f the different approach o f the party to the new social movements was the 
acceptance o f transsexuals as members in the party.
While BSP was composed o f TBCP, TİP, TSİP, Kurtuluş, Emek, Sosyalist Politika, 
Yeni Yol and the individuals, it should not be seen as an arithmetic addition o f the 
different groups, as the effect o f unity was more in a geometrical sense. Meanwhile, the 
largest organization o f the pre-1980 period, that is Dev-Yol, started to debate the 
legalization o f the movement on the basis o f a political party.
It was rather a movement coming from the grass roots. In Tank Zafer Tunaya 
Hall, 200 people met. The following meeting was held in Mecidiyeköy Culture Center, in 
which around 700-800 people were participated. A committee was elected about 40
cnugrui Kuntçu, ÖDF Kenctim Anianyor, pp. 113-143.77·
Atilla Aytemur, ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor, ibid. pp. 23-49.
^®The Trotsky’s group, which is the Turkish section o f Fourth International.
“^ ^he TKEP followers now referred to as Emek group in the 1990s.
®^This group split from Socialist Turkey Party (Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi) and joined the bloc.
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people that started to have debates with the BSP. In the following 5-6 months, in 50 cities, 
meetings were held. While these discussions were held, the whole segments o f the left 
were tried to be captured into this project. For example Anatolian Democracy Movement 
(Anadolu Demokrasi Hareketi) and the 68’liler Vakfi were trying to establish a political 
party. 200 people elected a committee o f 17, and these delegates joined the Dev-Yol 
delegates that were elected. The newly formed committee that was constituted o f 47 
delegates named itself as Constitute the Future Together Party Attempt (Geleceği Birlikte 
Kuralım Parti Girişimi, GBK).*^ Together with BSP and the independents four meetings 
were held in two weekends in Istanbul. The topics analysis o f the world, Turkey, 
organization and the party were discussed. A committee that was composed o f 6 GBK, 6 
BSP and 3 independent members founded the newly established party called Freedom and 
Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayamşma Partisi, ÖDP).
The history o f Turkish Marxist groups and parties that are related to ÖDP can be 
placed in three different groups: The legal socialist parties, the illegal socialist parties and 
the illegal socialist groups that could not transform themselves into political parties.
As noted, the second TİP and TSİP saw themselves as a continuation o f the first 
TİP, which forced them to form first a political party, then organize in the masses. In this 
respect, they joined the elections. On the other hand, it must be noted that not all o f their 
inclination was towards staying or acting on legal grounds, as their tendency was to 
overcome the existing establishment.
Contrary to the understanding o f forming legal socialist political parties, TKP and 
TKEP stayed as illegal throughout the 1970s. For TKP, it was not an end in itself to stay
*^Erkan Kayıtlı, Ö D P Kendini Anlatıyor, pp. 104-105.
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illegal, as it always tried to express itself on legal grounds. For example, the DİSK 
experience in the late 1970s should be viewed in this respect. As TKP was the follower o f 
the official Soviet line o f communism, it always conceived the changes both within and 
outside Turkey from the eyes o f Soviet thesis. On the other hand, TKEP never had an 
intention to turn itself into a legal organization, as its theoretical roots were based on 
THKO. The struggle, according to them, would be based on the illegal vanguard party. 
Unlike TKP, the formation o f the party was in the 1980, before the junta, as it was 
conceived that only with an illegal party that the liberation struggle could be achieved.
Unlike the two political party lines, both legal and illegal, Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş 
could not transform themselves into illegal parties. Rather, they stayed as front like 
organizations. Especially Dev-Yol, with its loose organizational structure always had a 
tendency to form a party, and the outcome o f this trend could be seen in the writings in 
Dev-Yol magazine. Unlike the other parties that were mentioned, both Kurtuluş and Dev- 
Yol supporters gathered around magazines first. It was first Devrimci-Gençlik magazine. 
After a split occurred. Kurtuluş Sosyalist Dergi on the one hand, and Devrimci-Yol on the 
other were started to be published, which was the reason that those movements were 
named as Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş. In this respect, the magazine names became the names o f 
these groups.
In general terms, the legal and illegal socialist parties, as well as the illegal 
organizations could not exceed the limits o f the Leninist tradition in the 1970s. The 
authority o f the leadership cadres were unquestionable. The outcome o f “deviant” ideas 
was to be labeled by being revisionist. Being “revisionist” and “anti-Marxist” were the 
two reasons for cadres to be dismissed from the organizational structure o f the parties and
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organizations. The centralization o f power in the hands o f the few decreased the effectivity 
o f the cadres in the mass level. Only Dev-Yol, although they declared themselves as 
Leninists, can be considered as being non-Leninist, as on the mass level, the cadres had the 
right to form policies on the basis o f local needs which were not dictated by the central 
organization. Moreover, there was not a pre-determined formulation of a political party to 
be formed, as the conjuncture would determine the structure o f the vanguard party, which 
distanced themselves from the Leninist party structure. The outcome was the mass 
support, especially from the ghettos o f the metropol cities.*^
Conceiving the cleavage structure on the basis o f capital and labor in the society 
was another determinant factor o f the socialist left in Turkey. The simple formulation o f 
“infra-structure determines the super-structure” was the thesis o f the Marxist left in 
Turkey, throughout the 1970s. Moreover, all the parties and groups tried to justify their 
cleavage structure on the basis o f the splits within the world communism. Parties such as 
TİP, TSİP and TKP can be conceived as the pro-Sovietic organizations, whereas Kurtuluş 
and Dev-Yol approached critically to both the Chinese and the Soviet thesis. For Kurtuluş 
and Dev-Yol, the road to socialism in Turkey would be based on its own path, which 
enabled them to develop their platform on the basis o f the realities o f Turkey.
Throughout the 1980s, all o f the movements and parties that were mentioned 
above transformed themselves in several ways. First o f all, the need to stay unified, with 
keeping their differences, was finally understood by them. The practical steps towards 
forming ÖDP should be conceived in this respect. Issues such as women, ecology, as well
*^Note that the Dev-Yol magazine was selling 100,000 copies a week in the late 1970s. In the 1997 of  
Turkey, only a comic magazine, Leman, can sell 100,000 copies a week. Especially, when we compare the 
population of the 1970s of Turkey and the 1990s o f Turkey, the number would be more effective.
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as socialist democracy were started to be debated by the organizations, which in turn 
brought both the realization o f different dynamics outside the class struggle, and the 
horizontal aspect of democracy within the organizations. Especially, the movements and 
parties that are represented in ÔDP faced this transformation period, and changed their 
theoretical and practical orientations in this manner. The outcome was a party that both 
inherits the old and the new left principles in a single organization.
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CHAPTER IV
ÔDP: Between the Old and New Politics.
In this chapter, ÔDP will be analyzed in terms o f its new approach to politics, as its 
political orientations to the practical problems in Turkey will be taken into consideration. 
Moreover, the disagreements within the party on the basis o f important issues such as the 
Kurdish problem will be elaborated. Lastly, in terms o f realization o f the party’s intentions 
will be taken into account.
OOP’s new approach to politics shows itself on three grounds: The political 
symbols that the party uses, approach to the political on the basis o f issue politics, and the 
meetings that the party organized. Additionally, the uniqueness o f the party shows itself on 
the organizational structure, which would be analyzed. Lastly, an analysis o f OOP will be 
given, in terms o f realization o f its priorities.
The significance o f ÔDP starts from the different approach they brought to the 
political symbols o f socialist tradition in Turkey. Although it is important for a political 
party to say different things that should have a meaning for the people, it is as equal as 
important how that political party expresses itself in the media and the meetings. In this 
sense, the part o f the socialist left that is now being represented in ÔDP has learned this 
process, in other words “by being consciousness o f how we are saying what we want to 
say”**'*, ÔDP is trying to create a new political culture in Turkey. The outcome o f this view 
was firstly represented in the logo o f the party.
84Erkan Kayıtlı, Ö D P Kendini Anlatıyor, p. 104.
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It was nearly a tradition that the socialist organizations, both legal and illegal, used 
red and yellow characters in their party emblems. Moreover, it has always been a rising 
fist, sickle, hammer or a star that was always chosen. Although they might represent a 
communication language in the 1970s, they had no meaning in the 1990s, as the 
communication means has changed. In this sense, a new political culture for ÖDP started 
from the logo o f the party. Its rising sun, that was colored by blue and red is a 
revolutionary approach to the new politics understanding. The red represents the struggle, 
fire, love, and the solidarity understanding o f the left, whereas blue stands for freedom, 
peace, independence, sea and the sky.*  ^ Even the word ‘freedom’ was written in a 
disorganized way in order to signify the ‘freedom o f the letters’, as opposed to the word 
‘solidarity’ as it was written in a straight way.
The outcome o f this new approach has also showed its impacts on the meetings of 
the party. Unlike the other red and yellow placards o f the other socialist parties, OOP’s 
are color oriented, which serves as a message to the other socialist/non-socialist political 
parties that “politics can be done in a smiling way”*®. One o f the good examples of this 
approach was the dressings o f the ecologist wing o f the party in the First o f May 
demonstrations in 1996, wearing nuclear reactor dresses, and carrying placards that 
condemn the nuclear energy.
The messages that were written on colorful placards also can be seen as a sign 
which distinguishes them from the other socialist parties. For example, in May First 
demonstrations in 1997, the Socialist Power Party (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi, SİP) has 
written the slogan o f “either the gang rule, or socialism"", whereas ÖDP puts the slogan as
85 Emre Senan, Ö D P Kendini Anlatıyor, p.93.
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“either the gangs or democracy'. This is one o f the typical examples that the party tries to 
fill the slogans with the reality o f that specific time. In this sense, the term socialism do not 
have one to one correspondence with the existing political reality o f Turkey, whereas the 
term democracy does. In not any single meeting, the terms revolution and socialism were 
written on the placards. This kind o f approach is the outcome o f the party’s new outlook 
to the concept o f politics.
After the party was founded, a campaign was started in order to vitalize the 
political orientation o f the party. The campaign was formalized in the slogans as “Do not 
be a dead in the war, unemployed on the street, restricted in politics” (Savaşta Ölü, 
Sokakta İşsiz, Siyasette Yasaklı Olmayalım). This slogan captures the main concern o f the 
party as the establishment o f peace in the south-eastern region o f Turkey, to find a 
solution to the unemployment problem, and the democratization process. These three 
issues, as will be analyzed, constitute the main priorities that the party is trying to build 
the opposition in Turkey.
It has been nearly ten years that the PKK and the military confrontations caused 
thousands o f deaths in the region. Nearly half o f the financial budget o f the country goes 
to the war. ÖDP seeks for a cease-fire between the fighting parties. By proposing this, 
they argue that the governments should take into consideration, the People’s Democracy 
Party’s (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP)MPs that could not enter the parliament in the 
last general elections due to the ten percent national threshold.**’ For ÖDP, HADEP is
ibid, p. 87.
*^HADEP formed an election coalition with other political parties in the general elections o f 1995, under 
the name of labor, peace and freedom bloc. The other political parties of the bloc were Socialist Power 
Party (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi, SİP), and the United Socialist Party (Birleşik Sosyalist Parti, BSP). The 
bloc won nearly %4,5 o f the total votes in the election.
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considered to be the true representatives o f the people living in that region. In this respect, 
ÖDP tries to place itself as a third party in the confrontation between PKK and the state. 
For them, it is not the military means to achieve stability in the region, but the political 
means, that is opening the communication channels, in order to talk about peace.
The search for a peaceful solution showed itself in the campaign o f “one million 
signatures for peace” (Barış İçin Bir Milyon İmza Kampanyası) which was initially 
implemented by a party member Eşber Yağmurdereli. The party supported this campaign, 
without representing the parties’ identity, as the most important thing was not to gain 
political support, but a democratic opening in the system, on the issue o f peace. The 
document was signed even by the businessman Sakıp Sabancı, which did not prevent the 
party to declare that they were supporting the campaign. This is a good example that the 
party is willing to side with the other segments o f society for as long as it serves the 
purpose o f strengthening the party policies. The campaign ended on the May 17, 1997 by 
the arrival o f the ‘peace train’ to Ankara, with handing o f the peace petition, to the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly.
By proposing civil solutions instead o f military confrontations, the party, indirectly, 
supports issue o f freedom o f speech. In this respect, the demand for peace serves for two 
purposes. The first one is the establishment o f peace in the region, and the second one is 
the opening o f the communication channels between both the fighting sides and HADEP 
that serves as a tool for defending the freedom o f speech in Turkey.
Another issue, which is given priority in the agenda o f ÖDP was the issue o f 
privatization wave in Turkey. Accordingly, the State Economic Enterprises (Kamu İktisadi 
Teşekkülleri, KİT) were making profits till the 1990s, although the investments were cut
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off. The party conceives the issue, not as a means to overcome the production problems, 
but as a re-constitution o f capitalism in global scale. In this sense, it defends the public 
sector against privatization. Moreover, the perspective o f state owned work places would 
be transformed in a de-centralizing way which meant a new model o f management in the 
work places. According to the proposed model, the employees o f the work places would 
elect a committee in order to supervise the production process.
The committees that ODP supports would be constituted by every single employee 
that is working in that organization. The supervising process would be constituted by 
opening all the accounts o f the work places to the employees. This supervising committees 
would have the right to demand technical reports from the commanding managers, which 
may result in the vetoing o f the manager administrations.
Moreover, these supervising committees, as well as outside organizations would 
further be controlled by consumer, ecologist associations, which would serve as counter­
power sources in the daily struggles.** If  achieved, this kind o f management would give 
birth to dual power structures, which would endanger the being o f the system. The 
strategy can be seen as not expropriation o f the means o f production, but the enlarging o f 
public ownership, that increases the democratization process in terms o f equality.
The reasons for defending the public sector in the way ODP proposed, according 
to them, would decrease the power o f the elected governments on the production process 
as the latter has always been subject to changes as new governments came to power in 
Turkey. Moreover the tax evasion, which is very common in Turkey, would eventually 
decrease as it is nearly impossible to do it in state owned sectors. The monopolistic
**“Biz Toplumsal Olandan Yanayız”, ÖDP Broşür Dizisi.
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character o f some state owned organizations, if privatized, would cause those sectors to 
be monopolistic in the hands o f the private sector, which would increase the prices o f the 
products.
On the national level, privatization would increase unemployment, which would in 
turn effect the most un-organized segments o f the society, namely the women. Moreover, 
if the privatization would ever be successful, it would only relax the budget for a short 
time, that meant that there would be more spending on the war, which according to the 
party, links the privatization issue to the Kurdish issue and the peace.
The daily developments in the country also affected the policy orientation o f the 
party, as it was the case in DYP and Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) coalition 
government. Political Islam was conceived as a threat on the way for “reaching the 
contemporary civilization level” especially by the left and Kemalist circles. The outcome 
was the indirect support o f the intervention o f the Turkish military that would eliminate 
the threat. On the other hand, the right parties o f the political spectrum were giving credit 
to the authoritarian understanding o f political Islam, as they were afraid o f loosing their 
conservative votes. In this respect, ODP again tried to be a third part in the debates.
ODP looks at political Islam, both from a political and a social perspective. In this 
respect, the party sees the emergence o f Political Islam as a reaction to the republican 
state. As the party co-president Saruhan 01u9 stated, “the state in Turkey imposes the 
identity upon its citizens” .*^  The authoritarian secularism o f the state should be replaced by 
‘libertarian laicism’, in which the sphere o f freedom and democracy should be enlarged, 
that would automatically lead to a re-definition o f the public sphere. The right to practice
Saruhan Oluç, “Yüksek Tansiyon”, HBB TV, May 7, 1997.
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religion should be protected by laws. Moreover, “Everybody should be free in choosing 
their life styles, as well as religion and clothes”. All the religious education, providing 
religious cadres such as imams as well as building mosques should be given to the 
denominations and the community. By defining a new understanding o f secularism, the 
party sees the main solution to the revival o f political Islam on the basis o f 
democratization. In other words, “Neither the religion should determine the state, nor visa 
versa”.^‘ In order to express the political orientation of the party on practical grounds, a 
meeting was held on May 25, 1997 in Sultanahmet, Istanbul.
The slogan o f “Not Sheria, not Intervention, free democratic Turkey” (Ne Şeriat 
Ne Darbe, Özgür Demokratik Türkiye), was the outcome between the two paths o f 
authoritarianism, that is an authoritarian Islamic state and the possibility o f an intervention 
o f the military. The meeting was also supported by HADEP, DİSK, and the Public 
Laborers Union Confederation (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikası Konfederasyonu, KESK), in 
which more than 40,000 people p a rtic ip a ted .S o m e  participants brought mirrors to 
“enlighten the dark Turkey” by sunlight, whereas others protested the government with 
tolls and bells. It is also important to mention that there were children with their parents in 
the meeting, which is very unusual for any political party demonstrations in Turkey. After 
the meeting, the garbage that was left in Sultanahmet Square was put into garbage boxes 
by party officials -who mostly were women party members-, that has got the label o f
^  “Demokratikleşme İçin Taleplerimiz”, ÖDP Broşür Dizisi.
Ufuk Uras, “ÖDP, Kültür ve Siyaset”, Düşler no 13, (1997), p. 10. 
^ ‘Refahyol’a Tepki Mitingi”, Sabah, May 26, 1997, p. 21.
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“Prosperity-Path”‘^ ,^ which signified the coalition of DYP and RP. In this respect, both the 
ecologist and the pro-woman status of the party was taken one step further.
Although the party was mainly founded by socialists, there were other non-socialist 
contributors to the making o f the process. The anti-militarists, non-socialist feminists, as 
well as ecologists, who were mainly coming from the Green Party which was closed at the 
beginning o f 1990s, involved in the project. The outcome was the realization o f different 
non-class identities to be incorporated into the party, which effected the political 
orientations o f the party. In this respect, Bergama incident is one o f the good indicators of 
this inclination.
The firm Eurogold started to build a factory in Bergama in order to search for gold 
with cyanide. A committee was formed by ÖDP, CHP, IŒ SK members and the village 
headmen, that was constituted by nine members, in order to organize against searching 
gold with cyanide in the region. In November 9, 1996, 5000 people with nearly 100 
tractors closed the road between Izmir and Çanakkale to traffic for 8 hours. On November 
25, a meeting was held in Bergama with coffins representing the poisonous effect o f 
cyanide. In the following month, another demonstration was held with 1500 people, in 
which 200 o f the males were half-naked. Lastly, in the 12th o f January, a referendum was 
held in Bergama. Out of 3232 recorded electors, 2865 people participated in the voting 
process, in which all o f them said no to search for golden by cyanide. '^* In May 19, 1997, a 
picnic was held in Bergama, in which the anti-cyanide supporters attended. The 
significance o f the incident was the celebration o f the decision o f the Council o f State on 
stopping the search for gold with cyanide. The mediatic character o f the Bergama
®^ The coalition o f RP and DYP was named in the media as Refahyol government.
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activities were largely founded by ÖDP members, which can be taken into consideration as 
the new way o f doing politics, which also received the attention o f the media.
The old cleavage between the labor and the capital (although it is accepted as one 
o f the most important cleavages), is treated equally with other dynamics o f change in the 
society. As noted, the struggle for the new society would not only mean to come to power 
in political terms but also means “the polarization o f the daily life, that would be 
incorporated with the utopias” .^ ^
One o f the best indicators o f this statement was the bicycle tour that the party has 
organized in Bakırköy, Istanbul, at the beginning o f 1996. The party members, as well as 
the president o f the party Ufiik liras joined the incident. It was the first time that such a 
“non-political” act was being organized by a political party. The signifying aspect was to 
show that even issues which were supposed to be resting on the private sphere o f the 
liberal democratic tradition, have inherently, have the potential o f being politicized. In this 
respect, just like an ordinary bicycle tour can be politicized, the other spheres o f the 
private sphere can also be politicized, which would in turn bring the need for the re­
definition o f he public sphere.
Another significant indicator o f this inclination was the organization o f the picnics 
in the weekends by the party members. Those picnics, both serve as tools for integrating 
the party members and supporters to the party environment, as well as the politicization o f 
another “non-political” sphere o f social life. For example, after the decision o f the court, 
on behalf o f the demands o f the Bergama committee, another picnic was held in Bergama, 
in which the peasants, as well as the party members were participated. In conjunction with
‘^*0DP, Partiye Açık Mektup, no 0.
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these initiatives, the party shows its willingness to support issues which are not confined 
with class based conflicts.
The most debated campaign that the party organized was the campaign o f “one 
minute o f darkness for an enlightened Turkey” (Aydınlık Türkiye İçin Bir Dakika 
Karanlık), which requested from people to close their lights at 21:00 PM every night.^® 
This campaign was the largest supported civil act in the post-1980 period. Millions o f 
people participated in this campaign by turning off their lights. Again, the public was not 
informed that the campaign was originally initiated by the ÖDP cadres, as it could 
decrease the participation rate. In this sense, it was very successful in mobilizing the 
masses both in the poor and the rich areas, and surprisingly, the urban rich neighborhoods 
were more interested in joining the protest.
In support o f protesting the Susurluk incident bills were hanged on the walls by 
the party and two slogans were used as “Either the gangs or democracy”, and “Let Ağar, 
Çiller and Bucak be sued”. The Istanbul branch o f the party arranged a meeting that 
started a march from Tünel to Galatasaray in Beyoğlu, with more than 1,500 people 
carrying candles in their hands on December 7.^’ This campaign was also supported by a 
meeting in Kızılay, Ankara in which ÖDP, KESK, HADEP and some other democratic 
mass organizations had participated. More than 15,000 people attended the meeting.
In relation to Susurluk incident, some other mediatic meetings and demonstrations 
were also held by the party. In October 9, 1996, the Istanbul organization o f the party 
arranged a press declaration in front o f the city toilets o f Taksim, and declared that only
®®The campaign was an act protesting the Susurluk incident, in which an MP, a police chief and a political 
murderer were caught in a car accident in the same car in Susurluk.
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the people could flush the toilets and let go off this dirt in Turkey, referring to the 
corruption o f politics.
In October 17, the ÖDP supporters with brooms in their hands held a 
demonstration in Ankara. More than 8,000 people attended the meeting with placards 
writing as “either they will held accountable for their deed, or the people would sweep 
them away” .^ ** In December 8 o f the same year, ÖDP arranged a meeting in the border 
gate o f Kapıkule to “prevent the escape o f the guilty people to other countries”, who are 
in relation with the Susurluk incident. 500 ÖDP supporters attended the demonstrations^^, 
and it also was broadcasted by the media. Especially with Susurluk meetings and 
demonstrations, the party supports its will to do politics in a smiling way.
It is not only the party’s new approach to politics that is new, but the 
organizational structure is unique when compared to the other political parties o f Turkey. 
In the fourth article o f the party by-laws, it is stated that the individuals, the groups or the 
platforms have a legal right to express their views and attitudes both to the public and to 
the people. The significance o f this article can be seen in the publications o f the 
platforms within the party, as nearly all the platforms have a publication, that both 
discusses their positions in the party, and their views about the events that took place, 
both in the party and in Turkey. Legitimizing the publication o f each platform enabled 
them to publish several magazines.
^Yeniden, no 19, (1996) p. 45.
^ibid.
^ibid.
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi. Program &. Tüzük, p.36.
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Kurtuluş group publishes the Socialist Liberation (Sosyalist Kurtuluş)“'*, which 
serves as a tool for elaborating both the theoretical and daily political orientations o f the 
party. The youth organization o f the platform also publishes a magazine called Young 
Liberation (Genç Kurtuluş). Some Dev-Yol supporters gathered around the magazine 
called Again (Yeniden)*** ,^ which is a monthly based magazine. Moreover a theoretical 
magazine called Revolution Again (Yeniden Devrim), and a youth magazine called Young 
Friend (Genç Arkadaş) are also published by this group. On the other hand the supporters 
o f the Left Bloc (Sol Blok) also publish several bulletins within the party, as well as 
publishing a theoretical magazine called Socialist Politics (Sosyalist Politika). Even Yeni 
Yol group, which is one o f the minor groups within the organization publishes a monthly 
magazine called New Course(Yeni Yol). The Emek group in the party, that was composed 
o f the ex-Communist Labor Party o f Turkey supporters also publish a magazine called 
Labor (Emek), but it could only be published three issues from the date o f the 
establishment o f the party. As can be seen, although the different platforms publish their 
own magazines which can be labeled as de facto publishings o f the party, there was only 
one publishing which could be considered as the direct representative o f the party which 
was called The Word (Söz). The magazine has started to be published in the days o f BSP, 
and declared that it dissolved itself in April 1997, so that a new magazine o f the party can 
be published.
Within the party, one o f the most important pressure group is the women. 
Although other groups in the party are represented in the party assembly on the basis o f
"'’’Not to be confused with the weekly published magazine called Kurtuluş, as it is the publication of 
illegal Dev-Sol, that changed its name to Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) at the
beginning o f 1990s.
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negotiation based consensus, the women, if they become candidates, are given a quota of 
30 percent at least, in the organs o f the party. This ‘positive discrimination’ is only present 
in ÖDP, by the will o f the party members. In this sense, the 30 percent quota, that CHP 
used, can not be considered as equal as ÖDP’s, as the decision o f CHP was implemented 
by the Socialist International. As liras stated, “it was the women in the party who 
demanded a positive discrimination, which makes it, not a decision that was taken from 
top to down but visa versa”. The behavior o f the women within the party gives birth to 
different situations sometimes, as in the meetings o f women’s day o f March 8, 1997, the 
3000 ÖDP women in Istanbul did not take the ÖDP men in their meetings.
On 18-19 May o f 1997, the forum o f ÖDP women was held in Ankara, with 160 
women participating from 20 provinces. The four main headings can give us hints about 
the discussions o f the women within the organization: Positive discrimination and the 
quota, women in business life, women in political Islam, and women in war. In the forum, 
most of the women supported the 30 percent quota, whereas it was argued that the quota 
alone was not enough. In this respect, the weekly meetings in the parties should consider 
the women also by not being so late, whereas some groups demanded financial support 
from the party organization for the raising of children in order to involve actively in 
politics. One o f the good examples o f decisions that was taken in favor o f women was that 
in Çankaya Congress o f the party in IS*** o f June, a room was given to the children to play 
in Çankaya ÖDP building, while their mothers would be in meetings.
Yeniden is selling 10,000 copies a month.
Ufuk Uras, “Türkiye’de Siyasi Gündem”, (Conference given at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, 
March 24, 1997).
'°‘*Nennin Özdemir, “Artık Omuz Atsamz da Düşmeyiz”, Yeniden, no 23 (1997).
Gülnur Savran, “ÖDP’li Kadınlara %30 Kota Yetmedi”, Sabah·. June 3, 1997.
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Another important factor that should be mentioned when talking about the gender 
issues in the party is that, on any grounds violence, both in the party and in the private 
sphere against the members, would be punished, that is would be sent to the disciplinary 
committee, by the organs o f the party. The members here represents mostly the women.“*® 
Moreover, this article is more important for the trans-sexual members o f the party, as the 
party does not discriminate the people on the basis o f sex, including how they lead their 
lives. There are currently registered five trans-sexual members o f the party in Beyoğlu, 
Istanbul, which is not only a revolutionary act in the socialist left, but also in the political 
history o f Turkey.
It should be noted that the organization o f the women within the party is still a 
debatable issue, as there are two views concerning the issue. The first one argues that the 
organizational structure should be a platform based on sex discrimination, whereas the 
other group argues that the women and the feminists should form a pressure group within 
the party.“*’
The recognition of the different platforms of the party serves for two purposes. 
The first one is the realization o f the internal democracy within the party. As liras stated 
“it is an attempt to create a party on the basis o f how we want to create a world”,*”* 
meaning that the differences should be kept so that no other identity can be imposed upon 
the other. This approach was taken one step further, as the members o f the party have the 
right to join the meetings of all the organs o f the party, including the party assembly, the
’®®The Çankaya organization o f the party in Ankara, agreed on the decision that violence against the 
children should also be punished by the party disciplinary committee and will propose this to the general 
congress o f ÖDP, in the autumn of 1997.
Aynın- İlyaslıoğlu, “ÖDP ve Kadınlar”, Birikim no 82, (1996).
'°**“Ufuk Uras’la Söyleşi”, Mürekkep, no 7, (1997) p.8.
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central administration board, the women, the youth and the autonomous platform meetings 
within the party such as Kurtuluş and Yeni Yol.
Secondly, the realization o f different autonomous platforms prevent a further split 
from the party, as most o f the platforms agreed on the need o f a unification o f the socialist 
left in Turkey. This is further rationalized as one o f the mistakes o f the left in the pre-1980 
period was seen as the split o f the parties and the groups. In the by-laws o f the party, it 
was stated that, action is based on the program and by-laws o f the party, but vitalization o f 
the decisions is based on w i l l i ng n e s s .O n  the other hand, it is stated that, nobody can 
organize a counter-action on the decisions that were taken by the party, that reminds us 
the fact that ÖDP is still a party, with an organizational discipline.
Although the instant reactions on the basis o f issue politics, can be considered as 
the outcome of the policy o f the party, some platforms in the party were not happy with 
the situation. For example after the broom meeting, a document in Ankara was opened for 
signing by the members o f Sol Blok“ '*, which accused the top party cadres o f arranging 
“middle class oriented protests” . The criticisms were mostly coming from the left bloc 
opposition within the party, that was composed o f the Sosyalist Politika supporters.
Moreover, it was not only the broom meeting that was criticized. It was also the 
campaign o f ‘one million signatures for peace’ which was brought into the picture by 
them, as it was seen as a “targetless campaign, which was not even talking about in which 
country the peace was demanded”. '"  It was added that it was intentional that the party
'^Program & Tüzük, p. 36.
" T h is  group is formed within the party by Sosyalist Politika supporters and some individuals.
I l l Cihan Keskin. “ÖDP ve Siyaset”, Sol Blok Bülten, p. 13.
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was trying to be placed within the center left o f the political spectrum o f Turkey, as the 
goal o f socialism was trying to be replaced by democracy."^
There are also disagreements within ÖDP about the Kurdish question, that also 
effects the policy making process o f the party. Especially the Kurtuluş platform and some 
independents are very eager to continue with the “labor, peace, freedom bloc” as they 
conceive the Kurds as “the leading dynamic of democracy”**^  in Turkey. This inclination 
shows its outcome in the slogans that were used by some party members in the 
demonstrations. For example, especially the Sosyalist Politika and Kurtuluş supporters are 
eager to continue the slogan o f “yesterday Vietnam, now Kurdistan, down with 
colonialism” (Dün Vietnam, Bugün Kürdistan, Kahrolsun Sömürgecilik) in the meetings, 
whereas the ones who are mostly Dev-Yol supporters and the independents prefer to stay 
silent in those times.
In parallel to this approach, the problem o f organizing in the Marshall law areas 
was again debated within the party. In BSP days, some platforms did not want the party to 
form organizations in the southeastern region as it was not taken as Turkey’s land. ÖDP’s 
approach to the incident was rather taking the middle way, as in the third Party Assembly, 
it was accepted that only if a demand would come, than the party would be organized in 
the south-eastern Anatolian regions. Moreover, in the by-local elections o f June 1996, the 
party decided to participate the elections on its own, which was a sign that the bloc came 
to an end in a rather indirect way.
O f course, this was not a decision that was taken unilaterally by all the party 
members. As Mahir Sayın, a member o f Kurtuluş platform argued in Med TV that the
112.ibid. p. 14.
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ones who are standing against the bloc, which he called social chauvinists, would be 
eliminated form the party. The social chauvinists, according to him, represents mostly the 
Dev-Yol supporters, who do not look at the issue o f forming a bloc with HADEP in a 
positive way.
Moreover, it was not only the Kurtuluş platform, and the independents that 
supported the continuation o f the bloc, but also HADEP and PKK supported this kind of 
tendency. In a program at Med TV, Abdullah Öcalan left the gate open for ÖDP to join a 
bloc in the coming elections whereas HADEP announced that “the peace bloc was 
awaiting for the ÖDP” .^ *'* On the other hand Dev-Yol supporters and some independents 
were looking at the incident from another perspective. In 1996, İnönü Alpat, during a 
party conference on the question o f Kurds and secularism gave the example that in the 
peace meeting, the ÖDP supporters were using the slogan o f “do not join the army, do 
not spill brother blood”, whereas, in the same meeting, HADEP supporters were singing 
guerrilla songs, in favor o f PKK.“ * In this sense, Dev-Yol wing did not find HADEP 
confident on the issue o f peace, as they oppose the bloc.
Another example o f the clashing ideas about the Kurdish issue vitalized itself in the 
flag incident. After the Turkish flag was teared down in the HADEP congress, Erdal Kara, 
from the Istanbul organization o f ÖDP was joining a press declaration with the HADEP 
leaders, arguing that it was a provocation o f the state forces, whereas the Giresun 
organization o f ÖDP was hanging a Turkish flag on the window o f the Giresun district
İnönü Alpat, Şimdi Solun Zamanı, (Ankara; Doruk Yayınlan, 1996), p. 91.
"'’Demokrasi, 22, Şubat, 1996.
"^İnönü Alpat, in his speech at an ÖDP conference on the Kurdish question and secularism, Çankaya, 
June 25 1996.
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b u i l d i n g . This incident shows that although there seems to be some disagreement within 
the party, on the basis of group identities, the same can be said for the urban and rural 
organizations o f the party.
It is not only the political orientation of the party that is criticized, but also the 
party itself is being debated. On of the formulations within the party is “party being not a 
party”* t h a t  meant that the party organization was only vital for an opposition platform 
to be formed, in which the party is not a platform, but just a part o f it. The significance o f 
this outlook was “the struggle against hierarchy, centralism and the idea o f party 
discipline” '**, which would incorporate not only the socialists but also the other non­
socialist leftists and opposition forces. The struggle against the vertical relations, brought 
the importance of the horizontal relations within the party. The outcome was the 
acceptance o f the party posts, not ends in themselves, but only ordinary places. As ÔDP 
leader Ufiik Uras stated, “I am so ashamed when I hear the word ‘party leader’; the ÔDP 
has a leader because the Turkish laws require it” .* *^
The other side o f the coin can be seen in the formulation o f the ‘socialist party’, in 
which the aim is the targeting o f the rule o f the working class. Additionally, some groups 
argued that the laborers should constitute the majority o f the party also.*^ ** In very general 
terms, a middle path was agreed upon, which meant that no rigid expressions were used in 
the party program.
"^İnönü Alpat, Solun Zamanı, p. 101.
"^Bülent Forta, “Şimdi Yeni Bir ÖDP Tammlamahyız”, ÖDP Kendini Anlatıyor, pp. 63-82.
''^Bülent Forta, “Parti Sorunlu Bir Araç Ama...”, ÖDP Tartışmaları (İstanbul; Alan Yayıncılık, 1996). 
Ufiık Uras, “Fetret Devri Sona Erdi”, Tartışmaları.
Uğur Cankoçak, “Bağımsız Bir Sosyalist Parti”, Tartışmaları.
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Although it is important for a party to be different in theoretical sense, it is also 
important how those theoretical orientations were vitalized on practical level. The same 
thing applies for ÔDP as it has some difficulties in the realization o f its political 
orientations. On the other hand, some progress did achieved by the party, especially if it is 
considered that the party was founded only two years ago.
ÔDP had three inclinations to distance itself from; that is the socialists, the social 
democrats, and the other political parties o f Turkey. The party stands in the center o f 
socialist left in terms o f quantity. The best places for socialists to test their support had 
been the May First demonstrations in Turkey. In the last two years, ÔDP throughout 
Turkey has the largest supporters in the meetings after HADEP. One o f the reasons o f this 
was that ÔDP stands as a party that is composed o f the widely supported organizations o f 
the pre-1980 period. On the other hand, the leftists who search for an alternative on the 
left o f social democracy, and the ones who were not happy with the performance o f the 
social democrats in the last years also approach sympathetic to ÔDP, that is again a 
contributor to numbers o f the supporters. Moreover, with their organizational structure, 
and the importance given to the horizontal link o f democracy, both within and outside the 
party, ÔDP was successful in distancing itself from the socialist organizations of Turkey.
By distancing itself from the other socialist organizations o f Turkey, ÔDP, 
indirectly, criticizes the old left heritage. In the party program, it was stated that “ÔDP 
turned its face to socialism in a libertarian, self-administrator, internationalist, re-defining 
the nature human relationship, anti-militarist, without being sexist way, which would end 
up the rule o f the capital, imperialism by establishing the government o f the labor
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forces”.*^ * The definition o f this kind o f socialism distances the party from the other 
socialist experiences, as ODP considers them as the opposite o f the above statement.
By not giving credit to the democratic centrist approach of Leninism, the channels 
o f democracy are being opened within the party. The acceptation o f the different platforms 
within the party with their own views and allowing the publishings o f those platforms, 
without the interfering o f the central party body is the outcome of this kind o f an 
approach. The party is aware that nobody can have the potential to put itself in the center 
o f the truth, as the truth is something that is created. The outcome is the opening o f every 
communication channel, both within and outside the party in order to increase the 
horizontal organization of the concept o f democracy.
Within the party, as every group and platform has the right to express their own 
thoughts both within and outside the party, there seems to appear different truths. 
Contrary to this, there is not a priority o f any platform, view or group in the party. Against 
the state’s decision on constructing a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Uras stated that, 
“both the interests o f the workers and the nature are being treated on equal grounds; it is 
not that one o f them is one step ahead o f the other” .
By accepting the redefinition o f what constitutes the public and the political, 
automatically brings both enlarging and overcoming the limits o f liberal democratic 
tradition and capitalism. In this respect, the process o f change is not an overnight incident 
in the form o f a political revolution, but rather a long process o f transforming the relations 
within the civil society. The campaigns that the party got involved, such as the anti­
cyanide campaign in Bergama, the campaign o f “one million signature for peace”, and
121ODP Program & TtizGk, p. 36.
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“one minute darkness for an enlightened Turkey” should also be seen in the light o f the 
above inclination
The economic policy o f the party is one way or another based on the pre-1980 
theoretical roots for the different groups and parties. The publicly owned means o f 
production has been one o f the basic demands o f the socialist tradition, both in Turkey and 
in the world. On the other hand, the building o f alternative power structures, as proposed, 
was only vitalized by Dev-Yol in the pre-1980 period with the introduction o f the 
resistance committees. The idea o f building the counter-culture from today is a new 
approach to most o f the socialist groups and organizations, as it was thought that once the 
political revolution would be achieved, the transformation o f the social would follow. The 
Gramscian understanding o f the importance o f civil society is being realized by the ODP, 
as their economical program shows.
Another important indicator o f the conception o f the new is that the dynamic o f 
change is not only in the hands o f a specific social class. Although the party declared itself 
as the platform o f the labor, the term labor represents more than the old cleavage o f labor 
and capital. In this respect the party accepts the multilateral existence o f different 
cleavages. The outcome is the importance that is the given to the issue o f women, the 
ecology and the acceptance o f trans-sexuals in the party.
On the other hand, although it seems that the party seems to be the representative 
of the new left in Turkey, some platforms within the party are strictly tied to their old left 
heritage. In this respect, being represented in ODP is just a conjunctural obligation. 
Moreover, some minor groups join the party only for gaining a greater support, which
122iUfuk Uras, “Gündem”, Conference at Bilkent.
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would allow them to split from the party as they keep their organizational structures 
outside the party. For example some groups within the party have some professional 
members. These professionals are financed by the group supporters, which allow them to 
get involved only in political matters, as they don’t have any other jobs. In this way, the 
professionalization o f the people who involved in politics is, indirectly, being realized by 
some groups.
Within the party, the harmony o f the different platforms could not be achieved 
fully. Some platforms still could not internalize being members o f ÖDP, and are trying to 
make politics by their group identities. One o f the best indicators o f this trend, was the 
physical confrontations that the platform members face. In Ankara May First 
demonstrations o f 1997, a youth group within the party opened an illegal placard, that 
ended up with a fight between the Dev-Yol supporters who were against such an act, and 
the Kurtuluş supporters. Another example o f this trend was the fight between the youth 
branches o f Kurtuluş and Dev-Yol in the autumn o f 1997 in Çankaya ÖDP building. 
Whatever their reasons were, they symbolize the lack o f the conception o f ÖDP culture as 
a project. On the other hand, it must be noted that these kinds of physical confrontations 
are only vital among the young supporters o f the party, as the old people, regardless of 
their political identities, condemned such acts, and tried not be parts in the fights. 
Additionally, although the group identities are still kept strict by some platforms, a 
considerable amount o f job within the party are done by these groups. Without the help o f 
the groups, the meetings, for example, would not be so crowded as it is the case.
Another problem about the party was that the party could not effect the political 
agenda in Turkey. It just shows its reactions to the existing situations by meetings and
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declarations, but unable to create new issues. Moreover, those reactions were only 
effective, if the media would pay attention. For example, after Refah Partisi arranged a 
meeting in İnönü Stadium with 40,000 supporters in Istanbul, ÖDP arranged a democracy 
meeting in Fenerbahçe Stadium with the same amount o f p e o p l e . T h e  slogan o f the 
meeting was “Democracy Now” (Demokrasi Hemen). Although popular figures such as 
Ahmet Kaya, Bulutsuzluk Özlemi and Edip Akbayram gave small concerts in the meeting, 
the media did not pay attention to the incident. The party was not on the headlines o f the 
newspapers as it was the case in Sultanahmet meeting.
As the priorities o f the party are taken into consideration, ÖDP was able to 
distance itself both from the PKK and the state forces in the last two years. Although for 
any socialist group to distance itself from the latter has been much more easier than 
distancing itself from the former, the party tried to actualize the possibility o f a third way. 
For example in Sultanahmet meeting, the party threatened the ones who opened a PKK 
flag in HADEP group by ending the meeting. By demanding peace in the region, it also 
distanced itself from the political parties o f Turkey, as they were conceived as “war 
parties” .
The question should be raised, then, as whether with the limited amount of 
support, the party could realize the radical transformation o f the relations in the society. In 
terms o f support, the party, alone, does not seem to pass ten percent threshold. Only with 
an election coalition, there would be a chance to enter the parliament. The coalition 
partner would more likely to be HADEP, which would alienate a great amount o f people, 
both from the social democrat and socialist wings of voters. On the other hand, any
“5 Temmuz’da Fenerbahçe’de”, Yeniden no 26 (1997), p. 7.
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coalition with the social democrats, as CHP seems to be the only alternative, may decrease 
the credibility o f the party, as it would sacrifice the means in order to achieve the ends, 
that is entering to the parliament. The coalition with the social democrats could only be 
realized, if a labor based coalition program would be signed, that would also include 
HADEP. This alternative seems to be weak, as HADEP would alienate some voters o f 
CHP. Additionally, some platforms in the party would stand against a coalition with the 
social democrats, that would also decrease the harmony within the party.
Then the question should be raised, whether it is a must to enter the parliament, in 
order to enlarge the sphere o f democracy in Turkey. As the party has shown, as it was the 
case in Bergama, and the campaign o f “one million signatures for peace”, it is not a 
required thing to be represented in the parliament. The transformation o f the society, could 
also be made possible, if the party would collaborate with the opposition outside the 
establishment, that would redefine the concept o f the political. Moreover, the more the 
support o f the party increases, the more likely that the society in Turkey is transformed. In 





Throughout this study I tried to show the re-structuring o f some part o f the 
socialist left in Turkey. There were two motives behind the formulation o f ÔDP: The 
transformation o f the left in Europe and the re-structuring o f the socialist left after the 
defeat of 1980 in Turkey.
Following the transformation of the left in Europe and Turkey, an alternative 
against the reformist and the revolutionist understandings was formalized. In order for the 
‘third road’ to be realized in its full sense, the relations within the civil society were given 
priority in order to be transformed.
In this respect, it was not the state that was given a priority to be transformed. 
Although forming a government was also kept as an alternative, the radicalism o f the 
streets was tried to be incorporated within the newly formed opposition platforms. 
Moreover a concept like worker councils were introduced, as the important thing was to 
change the existing relations first. Additionally, the enlarging and overriding the liberal 
democratic tradition brought the utility o f issue politics. Especially in a country like 
Turkey, this approach is very likely to give its seeds in the coming future.
By applying a different understanding o f the conception o f what constitutes the 
political, three main things were tried to be done, which signifies the similarity with the 
European new left.
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Firstly, criticizing the liberal democratic tradition in Turkey, a redefinition o f the 
public was brought into the picture. The redefinition o f the public sphere shows itself in 
several grounds. The Kurdish question, the economical program of the party and the views 
about the rising trend o f political Islam should be perceived in this respect. Moreover, by 
not being part o f the dualist confrontations within the society such as secular-non secular 
and pro-PKK vs pro-state, the party tries to build the opposition on its own, by widening 
the democratic channels o f discussion. The strategy o f gradual change within the civil 
society is something that both Green Parties and the parties that are on the left o f social 
democracy in Western Europe try to pursue.
Secondly, as non-class dynamics were taken as different power sources for the 
transformation o f the society, issues like women and ecology are treated equally with the 
worker movements. The quota for women within the organizational framework and the 
participation o f the party in the anti-cyanide campaign in Bergama are the outcomes of this 
trend, although, compared to Western Europe, the new social movements in Turkey seem 
to be weaker in character. On the other hand, especially in the Western parts o f the 
country, the green movement on the local level is on the rise, which signifies a new 
dynamic worth to be given importance.
Thirdly, by distancing itself from the characterizations o f what is called the old left, 
the party can be considered as the institutionalization of European new left o f the 1960s in 
Turkey. The measures that increased the participation o f the members in the decision 
making process within the party is an attempt to overcome the bureaucratic heritage o f the 
old left. Moreover, the existence o f different platforms within the party is a sign that every
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individual and group do not loose their identities within the party organization. Rather 
they have the right to express their differences that distinguishes the party from the old left 
experiences.
From the perspective o f the change within the socialist tradition in Turkey, the 
following points are also important. Throughout the 1980s, the signs o f unification were 
always present. Especially with the introduction o f TBKP, SBP, BSA, BSP and ODP 
respectively, the unification projects were finally realized at the practical level. Moreover, 
these projects were based on new theories that tried to grab the realities o f Turkey.
One thing that the socialist left o f Turkey that is represented in ODP learned from 
the past experience was that the ends do no justify the means. The outcome was the 
erosion of the old left heritage. The old left for the socialist left o f Turkey was Leninism, 
that dominated the 1970s both with its organizational and ideological structure. In this 
respect, the organizational structure as well as the ideological orientations were not pre­
determined by a grand theory regardless o f time and space. Although this trend is not fiilly 
internalized by both the party members and the groups, positive signs can be seen as 
argued above.
While ODP was trying to re-formulate itself, there were other socialist 
organizations, both legal and illegal that tried to hold on to their old left heritage and 
condemned ODP as being revisionist. Even this treatment by the old left can be a sign that 
the socialists that are in ODP do transform themselves. On the other hand, the old socialist 
left was indirectly effected by the policy orientation o f the party also.
The socialist left, that is outside ODP responded in two different ways. The issue- 
based politics o f the party was accepted by some illegal organizations, and small illegal
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meetings were held throughout Istanbul. One example o f this trend can be seen in the 
“bread meetings”, where people protested the increase in the bread prices in Okmeydanı, 
Istanbul in the spring o f 1997.
On the other hand, there emerged a violent response targeting the party. In 
Istanbul, two Kadıköy ÖDP members were killed by TİKKO on June 16, 1997*^  ^ on the 
accusation that they were agents working for the state.*“  Another example o f this trend 
could be seen in the meeting protesting the Sivas massacre that was held in Ankara on July 
2, 1997, in which işçi Partisi supporters attacked the ÖDP supporters.*^’ These violent 
acts show us that although ÖDP symbolizes the new in the socialist tradition in T u rk ^ , 
some old cleavages between ÖDP groups and the others still remain as vital issues.
By considering the division between the old and the new left, it is more likely that 
ÖDP has the seeds for a new left alternative to display. By distancing itself from all 
political parties and organizations, both on theoretical and practical grounds, the concept 
o f the new is accentuated by the party. Although the groups within the party seem to face 
a problem o f identity crisis, it is more likely that time would integrate all the groups under 
the identity o f ÖDP.
On the level o f discourse, the thesis o f ÖDP may seem to be in parallel with other 
opposition circles in Turkey, such as the radical democrats and the liberals. Especially 
recognition o f the differences within the society is an issue which is even accepted by some 
Islamic fundamentalist circles. In this respect, ÖDP may seem to be defending liberal 
principles, in the sense that it demands the realization of the liberal democratic tradition in
'^ “^Cinayete Sol K ılıf’, Sosyalist Alternatif, no 1, (1997), p. 5.
'^®Note that one o f the murdered members, Behzat Yıldırım was a supporter o f TIKKO while he was in 
prison, but left the organization and joined ÖDP one year ago before the murder.
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its full sense. On the other hand, it is different from these groups on two grounds. First of 
all, although the party gives importance to partial gains within the system, it is opposed to 
capitalism and considers the social and economic aspects o f capitalism as important 
problems that need to be overcome. Secondly the realization o f liberal values is not an end 
in itself as ODP is aware that it is impossible to realize those principles in its full sense 
within the reality o f today. The outcome is the re-definition of what constitutes the 
political without giving up the utopias o f socialism. In this respect, for example, there 
would be the existence o f green socialists and socialist greens in the same party. The 
feminization process would further justify the integration of different lines o f thought, 
which would serve as a tool for embracing the multi-constituted problems of the society.
'^ “^Sivas’m Işığı Sönmeyecek”, Yeniden no 26, (1997), p. 5.
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LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS
Anatolian Democracy Movement: Anadolu Demokrasi Hareketi 
Communist Labor Party o f Turkey: Türkiye Komünist Emek Partisi (TKEP).
Freedom World: Özgürlük Dünyası.
Labor’s Flag: Emeğin Bayrağı.
Liberation: Kurtuluş.
Liberation Organization o f Turkey and Northern Kurdistan: Türkiye ve Kuzey Kürdistan 
Kurtuluş Örgütü.
Marxist Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit: Marksist Leninist Silahlı Propoganda Birliği 
(MLSPB).
Motherland Party: Anavatan Partisi (ANAP).
New Course: Yeni Yol
People Liberation Army o f Turkey: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO).
People Liberation Party-Front o f Turkey: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi 
(THKP-C).
People’s Democracy Party: Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP).
Republican People’s Party: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP).
Revolutionary Communist Party o f Turkey: Türkiye Devrimci Komünist Partisi (TDKP). 
Revolutionary Path: Devrimci Yol (Dev-Yol).
Revolutionary Left: Devrimci Sol (Dev-Sol).
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Revolutionary Socialist Bloc: Devrimci Sosyalist Blok (DSB).
Social Democrat Populist Party: Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (SHP).
Socialist Party: Sosyalist Parti.
Socialist Politics: Sosyalist Politika
Socialist Power Party: Sosyalist İktidar Partisi (SİP).
Socialist Turkey Party: Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi.
Socialist Worker Party o f Turkey: Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi (TSİP).
True Path Party: Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP).
United Socialist Alternative: Birleşik Sosyalist Alternatif (BSA).
United Socialist Party: Birleşik Sosyalist Parti (BSP).
Welfare party: Refah Partisi (RP).
Worker Party o f Turkey: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP).
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